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ABSTRACT
Technological advances have made it possible to scour vast arrays of
data in the digital world with algorithms. Investors, in particular hedge
funds, are spearheading this technology as means for investment research. In
the discussion of this growing trend, the spectre of potential insider trading
always looms large and is oft-cited, but seldom analysed in detail. This
article looks closely, while trying to be mindful of real-world practices, at
the state of play in insider trading doctrine with regard to investments made
in reliance on scraped data. Additionally, the article clearly lays out the
arguments for and against regulating data scraping via insider trading law –
bringing to the forefront the policy concerns which may well be underlying
future regulatory and judicial activity in this area –, focusing on incentive
mechanisms.
As for the outcome regarding current legal doctrine, utilizing scraped
data for investment research will only rarely result in insider trading liability.
On the policy side, the arguments against policing any and all data protection
violations with insider trading doctrine win out. Bringing the heavy hammer
of insider trading down on investors relying on scraped data is ill-suited for
likely policy goals, would disincentivize progressive thinkers as well as
fossilize market dominance of data giants, and impair the free market
equilibrium the U.S. economy is built on.
*
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Exposé
Drawing on almost every aspect of life, companies, governments and
individuals gather a constant stream of data that is published in some publicly
available form on the World Wide Web. Much of that data (experts estimate
that the overwhelming majority of data that exists worldwide has been
created in the last two years
1
) lies about – and takes up space – like trash.
Much like trash, however, the ever-inventive business world has found a way
to monetize this apparent wasteland of only seemingly useless information.
Data vendors are now scraping the internet for all kinds of information,
packaging that data in a way that it can be easily transferred and selling that
data off to whomever is interested. As with some other trends
2
, hedge funds
are spearheading this innovative new area, as they – through their fee
structure – are the ones most incentivized to seek out new ways to maximize
profit.
3
Macroeconomic trading in currencies and government bonds that relies,
among other things, on national statistics can be helped by data that can serve
1. See Avi Salzman, Your Personal Data Is Being Used by Investors. Here’s the
Potential — and the Risks, BARRON’S (November 30, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articl
es/how-big-investors-use-your-personal-data-to-play-the-stock-market-1543627499 [https://
perma.cc/4R8A-2X2J] (quoting Tobias Moskowitz, a professor at Yale School of
Management: “[W]e produced more data last year than we did in the whole history of
humanity”).
2. See, e.g., Kendall R. Pauley, Why Salman is a Game-Changer for the Political
Intelligence Industry, 67 A. U. L. REV. 603, 635–36 (2017) (detailing the use of political
intelligence by hedge funds).
3. See Alan Crane, Kevin Crotty & Tarik Umar, Hedge Funds and Public Information
Acquisition 3 (April 23, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=312782
5 [https://perma.cc/PQ6F-P6UR] (“[S]crapers [hedge funds that systematically use computer
programs to gather large quantities of public filings automatically from the SECwebsite] earn
1.8% higher annualized abnormal returns than non-scrapers”); DELOITTE CTR. FOR FIN.
SERVS., ALTERNATIVE DATA FOR INVESTMENT DECISIONS: TODAY’S INNOVATION COULD BE
TOMORROW’S REQUIREMENT 3 (2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam /Deloitte/us/D
ocuments/financial-services/us-fsi-dcfs-alternative-data-for-investment-decisions.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/GUV9-4A2D] (“Hedge funds have been in the foreground of alternative data
innovation”); Matt Egan, How hedge funds use drones, satellite images and web scraping to
gain an edge, CNNBUSINESS (July 10, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019 /07/10/investing/
hedge-fund-drones-alternative-data/index.html [https://perma.cc/VD3X-FQ26] (“The biggest
bucket of alternative data is scraping publicly available data from the web.”); Jen Wieczner,
How Investors are Using Social Media to Make Money, FORTUNE (December 7, 2015), https:
//fortune.com/2015/12/07/dataminr-hedge-funds-twitter-data/ [https://perma.cc/JWP5-FYG
Z] (quoting Matthew Granade, chief data analyst at Point72, a hedge fund: “Overall, I think
this is a golden age for new investment data sources.”).
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as a stand-in for inflation rates (e.g. online retailers’ general price trends) or
by information shining a light on the development of trade balances (port
statistics) and trading in shares of individual companies (or sector-specific
trading) can be improved by data signaling product interest and, more
specifically, sales performance (e.g. price setting at major online retailers;
satellite imagery depicting departure of delivery trucks or arrival of
customers; foot traffic trends surrounding major retail locations deduced
from location data of smartphone users).
4
According to some reports,
investment managers (including hedge funds) accounted for around five
percent of all internet traffic in 2018 in their search for data underpinning
their trading strategy and hedge funds are expected to spend about two billion
dollars – and growing – on gathering or purchasing such data.
5
That is to be
seen against the backdrop that companies are becoming increasingly
cautious about how detailed they want their investor disclosure data to be as
they fear short-termist activists reacting to the tiniest aberration ever more.
6
Given the size of this market and the significance of the method as the “next
big trend” in trading, the legality of trading on scraped data is of paramount
importance to hedge funds – being frequent targets of SEC and DOJ
4. Wary scouts, Hedge funds worry about the legal risks of using “alternative” data,
THE ECONOMIST (June 21, 2018) [hereinafter THE ECONOMIST], https://www.economist.com/
finance-and-economics/2018/06/21/hedge-funds-worry-about-the-legal-risks-of-using-altern
ative-data [https://perma.cc/RL56-K2GL]. For the slogan of an emerging data analytics firm,
see Battlefin, https://www.battlefin.com [https://perma.cc/7VRM-JL9C]: “Using Geolocation
to understand customer movement and buying habits, Satellite Imagery to track parking lots,
applying Sentiment indicators to interpret news quickly and other methods are helping
identify investment ideas.” According to a survey of around 70 investment managers who,
individually, had between $100 million and $1 trillion assets under management, the six items
highest on their “Alternative Data Wishlist” were “Logistics Data, Evaluated Prices, Private
company data, Supply chain risk data, Historical credit score data [and] Geolocation data.”
GREENWHICHASSOCS., Alternative Data for Alpha 6 (January 31, 2017), https://www.greenw
ich.com/equities /alternative-data-alpha [https://perma.cc/AWF8-83SP].
5. Bradley Saacks, Hedge funds will spend $2 billion on web-scraping software to gain
an edge, and it’s part of an investing gold rush, BUSINESS INSIDER (February 11, 2019), https://
www.businessinsider.com/web-scraping-by-hedge-funds-is-growing-rapidly-2019-2 [https://
perma.cc/QEY3-KX48]; see also DELOITTE CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS., supra note 3, at 1
(“Alternative data will likely transform active investment management (IM) over the next five
years”). In 2013, scraping is reported to have accounted for a quarter of all Internet activity.
Myra F. Din, Breaching and Entering: When Data Scraping Should be a Federal Computer
Hacking Crime, 81 BROOK. L.REV. 405, 440 (2015).
6. See Annie Gaus, Apple to Stop Breaking Out iPhone Unit Sales -- Investors Aren’t
Thrilled, THESTREET (November 2, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/technology/apple-won-
t-break-out-iphone-unit-sales-and-investors-aren-t-thrilled-14767050 [https://perma.cc/VCZ
6-Q95F] (reporting on Apple’s decision to no longer publish individualized sales figures for
iPhones, Macs and iPads from December 2018 on (as well as the precipitous stock drop-off
following the announcement of the news in an investor relations call)).
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enforcement actions
7
– and has far-reaching policy implications.
SEC v. Dot9
8
: DataPortal, a data processing company founded by
two ambitious coders with a background in investment
analytics, regularly gathers information off the internet with a
scraping algorithm, packages the information according to
industry needs and subsequently sells those packages to
professional investors, among them Dot9, a hedge fund. In one
instance, DataPortal accessed customerreview.com, a website
dedicated to providing a grass-roots platform for customer
complaints regarding commercial merchandise, and scraped
the websites’ various threads with the aim of capturing bug and
malfunction trends of various technology companies’ newest
releases. The Terms of Use of customerreview.com state the
reviews are designated for public access and that any scraping
for commercial purposes is prohibited. Each user/reader is also
asked to identify itself via CAPTCHA, a mechanism to weed
out bot activity which DataPortal’s scraping schema is able to
circumvent. In addition to that, DataPortal purchased a set of
user location data from LocalCookBook, a popular app that
generates regional recipes according to the user’s location.
Users of the app have all accepted the Terms of Use, which
state in the fine print, among other things, that LocalCookBook
may use aggregated and anonymized location data for
commercial purposes. Finally, DataPortal, its analytics
services regularly being contracted for by major technology
companies, compiles a statistic showing trends in what
percentage of recorded Apple Store visitors buy products
versus those who merely report faulty merchandise at the
Genius Bar using data that DataPortal had access to for a store
utility study it was working on for Apple. The portfolio
7. See, for example, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014)
(involving hedge fund managers for Diamondback Capital and Level Global Investors). See
more generally Jon Eisenberg, Insider Trading Law After Salman, HARV. L. SCH. F. ONCORP.
GOV.AND FIN. REG. (January 18, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/18/ insider-
trading-law-after-salman/ [https://perma.cc/V8Q6-AG66] (“Hedge Fund managers have been
among the most frequent targets in both criminal and civil insider trading cases. [ . . . ] For
the period 2010 to 2014 alone, the SEC’s “spotlight” on insider trading includes cases against
nearly 40 hedge fund managers, hedge funds, and those who allegedly tipped them.”).
8. This is a hypothetical case example purely designed to better illustrate some of the
issues that are being analysed below. Any factual similarities to actual individuals,
corporations or behavioral patterns thereof are unintended.
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manager (PM) at Dot9 purchased all three sets of data with an
exclusivity assurance by DataPortal, with the purchase
agreement containing an assurance by DataPortal that all
information subject to the agreement has been obtained
lawfully, being fully aware of where the data came from
generally but without specific knowledge of DataPortal’s
scraping process (even though the level of detail that
DataPortal was able to provide on the buying/complaint-
lodging customer split did strike him as “odd” in an email to
one of his associates, especially given the fact that DataPortal
had shared with him the good news of a “fat new contract with
Apple”), and uses them, together with his own analysis and
other publicly available information to “short” Apple stock for
the upcoming quarter as the data purchased from DataPortal
shows a sharp increase in customer complaints for a recently
released gadget
9
, a statistically significant drop-off in foot
traffic around Apple stores following the first widely reported
malfunctions and an ever-increasing percentage of Apple Store
visitors that report product faults. As expected by the PM,
Apple stock dips significantly when the new quarterly report
(Form 10-Q) is publicly filed with the SEC, and Dot9 is able to
generate a fifty million dollar profit on its initial investment of
two million dollars through shortselling in a timespan of three
months. The SEC is opening an investigation into the matter
as it suspects Dot9 (through its PM) has committed insider
trading through the use of material, non-public information in
executing its securities trades.
The compatibility of data scraping with current insider trading laws is
a topic that has garnered significant attention in the wake of the evolution of
big data and enhanced government scrutiny in this area: Jonathan R. Streeter,
a partner at Dechert LLP, was recently interviewed by Newsweek saying:
There are some of these data sets that start to look like, wow,
someone is really going to have a huge advantage if they
have this data set. If you’re a hedge fund you may be able
to buy this data set and ordinary investors don’t have
9. For a real-world example, see Wieczner, supra note 3. “Irish research firm Eagle
Alpha, for example, digested 7,416 comments on a Reddit gaming thread in October to predict
that Electronic Arts (EA) would sell more of its new Star Wars videogame than it had
projected; Electronic Arts soon raised its sales forecast, citing “excitement” over the game.”
Id.
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access to that information. And that is material, non-public
information about product sales that a public company is
going to announce at its next quarterly earnings.
10
This article will take a look at both the current state of play in insider
trading law as well as at the possible policy arguments for and against
allowing scraping practices from a doctrinal perspective.
B. Structural Approach
The approach to structuring this topic will first focus on proper
definitions of the key terminology, i.e. “insider trading” and “scraped
information.” The rest of the paper will then be divided into two parts: The
first half will focus on whether current practices of data scraping (some
hypotheticals will be provided and discussed) can actually lead to insider
trading liability. Three areas that will be focused on will be the question of
non-public information (since data scraping revolves essentially around a
scouring of the public domain
11
), the standard of materiality (since it is
unclear if a “reasonable investor would view it as significantly altering the
‘total mix’ of information available”
12
when only data accumulated by “big
data” is concerned
13
) and the issue of whether scraped data can be
misappropriated under the common definition (this will depend on whether
courts would be willing to equate the terms of use of a website – which
oftentimes include safeguards against scraping – to the creation of a fiduciary
10. Ian Allison, Big Data, Big Problem: Could Wall Street See Insider Trading Lawsuits
Over Selling Data Sets?, NEWSWEEK (November 10, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/cou
ld-wall-street-see-first-legal-action-selling-data-sets-682188 [https://perma.cc/Z8E7-H2XP].
See also Egan, supra note 3 (quoting Justin Zhen, co-founder of Thinknum, an alternative
data provider: “You can wait until companies announce earnings and the whole world will
know how companies did. Or, you can know two months in advance.”); Kris Kappel & Liam
Reilly, Consider Potential Risks Of Scraping Publicly Available Data, LAW360 (November
13, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1093344/consider-potential-risks-of-scraping-p
ublicly-available-data [https://perma.cc/BLN4-6VLX] (“So, as the internet continues to
evolve, dislocating one industry after another, there is a remarkable irony at the heart of it all
— the legal ambiguity of data scraping.).
11. SeeShaw Horton, A Fund Manager’s Roadmap to Big Data: Its Acquisition and
Proper Use (Part Two of Three), 3 THEHEDGE FUNDLAWREPORT 6 (2018), https://www.low
enstein.com/media/4297/hflr_a-fund-manager-s-roadmap-to-big-data_its-acquisition-and-pr
oper-use.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SKK-JX44] (“[A]ll that managers would have left is that the
information obtained is public”).
12. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).
13. Peter Altman, Kelly Handschumacher & Jennifer Hustwitt, Big Data and the Risks
of Insider Trading, 50 SEC. REG. L. REP. 426, 426–27 (March 19, 2018), https://www.akingu
mp.com/images/content/6/5/v2/65585/spBigData-SRLR-March-19-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D58K-84RG].
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relationship between user and usee
14
).
The other half will be devoted to the policy question of whether data
scraping might lead to insider trading liability in the future through shifts in
enforcement brought about by a policy impetus. One could question whether
trading profits should be acquired on the back of private personal data.
Similarly, one can doubt whether the perception of what “non-public” is,
needs to be changed in the face of such an overwhelming amount of
technically freely available data that only entities with exorbitant computing
capabilities can actually make sense of it. On the other hand, there is
something to be said for letting companies leverage their data computing
capabilities as anything else would constrain their ability to make money.
Additionally, threatening SEC enforcement against traders who employ
professional information-obtaining strategies may seem dubious as that is
basically their job description. Furthermore, one would need to look if such
insider trading liability would lead to significantly impeding trading overall
(likely a net negative for society as a whole) as the boundaries between
legally obtained and scraped information become too blurry for traders to be
confident that they know where the line” is – and the efficacy and
foreseeability of the legal regime governing securities trades may be put at
risk for questionable benefit.
II. TERMINOLOGY
A. Insider Trading
Insider trading liability can arise under the antifraud provisions of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.
15
According to Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, it is unlawful
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, or any
securities-based swap agreement1 any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
14. Horton, supra note 11, at 6 (claiming that courts regarding the breach of a website’s
terms of use through the use of deception to be sufficient for insider trading liability to “not
be an enormous leap”).
15. For a primer, see Insider Trading, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersin
siderhtm.html [https://perma.cc/Y63P-KMUN].
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protection of investors.
16
According to Rule 10b-5, which the SEC promulgated to colour Section
10(b), it is illegal for any person, “[t]o employ any device, scheme or artifice
to defraud,” or “[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person [ . . . ] in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”
17
As the SEC’s
authority to promulgate a regulation rests on the will of Congress as
incorporated in the statute, Rule 10b-5 cannot go beyond what Section 10(b)
intended.
18
The general requirements for insider trading developed under that
highly abstract regulatory regime
19
are that someone (1) misappropriated
information from someone else to whom he
20
owed a fiduciary duty of sorts,
(2) the trader possessed material, non-public information (3) in connection
with the sale or purchase of securities and (4) acted with scienter towards
requirements (1)-(3). The laws against insider trading are to be interpreted
as “enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds [on the market], not
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes.”
21
B. Data Scraping
The Oxford Dictionary defines data scraping as: “Extracting large
amounts of data from an online source (often using an automated tool),
especially where it is then reproduced somewhere else. Search engines
routinely do this in ways which benefit web publishers, but in some cases it
is a malicious practice.”
22
The literal definition of the word in an acclaimed
dictionary partially connotes a somewhat underhanded nature of the practice
in question.
On a more technical level, Wikipedia defines the practice as involving
a “technique in which a computer program extracts data from human-
16. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5.
18. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212–14 (1976).
19. But seeMiriam H. Baer, Insider Trading’s Legality Problem, 127 YALE L. J. FORUM
129, 137 (June 19, 2017) (“[I]nsider trading clearly registers at the end of the spectrum where
legislative definition is murky at best”).
20. In the following, the use of “he” is also meant to refer to the pronouns “she” and
“they”.
21. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
22. Scraping, DANIEL CHANDLER & ROD MUNDAY, A DICTIONARY OF SOCIAL MEDIA
(Oxford Univ. Press 2016).
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readable output coming from another program.”
23
Speaking more generally and drawing on the definitions mentioned
above, data scraping concerns the process of obtaining information through
scouring the internet or other open data channels (i.e. the publicly available
space) with search or order algorithms
24
– rather than manually perusing
them
25
– that enable the user to locate information that can be of economic
(trading) value to him (e.g. sales data of specific companies/industry areas,
search preferences of customers, mention of specific terms in forums etc.).
26
Publicly searchable (or exploitable) data may nowadays include information
that one intuitively considers private, for example, the transaction feed and
live data flow of certain apps.
27
So-called data brokers regularly access
information made publicly available by state and federal governments,
scrape social media and commercial sites, purchase proprietary data sets and
then sell that accumulated information to interested parties, among them
hedge funds.
28
23. Data scraping, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_scraping [https://per
ma.cc/KH5Z-G8BG] (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
24. For a practical guide, compare Rasha Ashraf, Scraping EDGAR with Python, 92 J.
EDUC. FOR BUS. 179 (2017), and Michael T. Braun, Goran Kuljanin & Richard P. DeShon,
Special Considerations for the Acquisition and Wrangling of Big Data, 21 ORG. RES.
METHODS 633, 639–40 (2018).
25. See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 16 (D.C. 2018) (“Scraping is merely a
technological advance that makes information collection easier; it is not meaningfully
different from using a tape recorder instead of taking written notes, or using the panorama
function on a smartphone instead of taking a series of photos from different positions.”).
26. See Ryanair DAC v. Expedia Inc., No. C17-1789RSL, 2018 WL 3727599, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 6, 2018) for a succinct practical example. “The basis for this suit is the
way Expedia gets Ryanair’s flight and price information. Ryanair alleges that Expedia
employs a program—known, among other names, as a “screen scraper”—to automatically
gather (or “scrape”) data from the Ryanair website. [ . . . ] The scraper mimics a customer to
access the website, sifts through its code, and extracts relevant information about flights, seats,
and prices.” Id. For more detail, see Din, supra note 5, at 410–13; Jeffrey K. Hirschey,
Symbiotic Relationships: Pragmatic Acceptance of Data Scraping, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.,
ANN. REV. L AND TECH. 897, 903–06 (2014).
27. Recently, a tech-savvy Venmo user was able to scrape an immense volume of
transaction details from its data feed. Dan Salmon, I Scraped Millions of Venmo Payments:
Your Data Is at Risk, WIRED (June 26, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/i-scraped-millio
ns-of-venmo-payments-your-data-is-at-risk [https://perma.cc/2UA6-73XK].
28. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY46–47 (May 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/ da
ta-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140
527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6G2-LSDW]; Jennifer Valentino-DeVries,
Natasha Singer, Michael H. Keller & Aaron Krolik, Your Apps Know Where You Were Last
Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html [https://perma.cc/MT
G7-VQNZ]. In 2018, the market value of consumer data trade was valued at $19 billion in
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III. LEGALANALYSIS – ARE TRADESBASED ON SCRAPEDDATA
AT ANACUTERISK OFBEINGCONSIDERED INSIDER TRADING
VIOLATIONS?
The legal analysis will follow the structure of insider trading
prerequisites. More specifically, it will focus on the materiality of scraped
data, whether such information can be considered non-public and if, and to
what extent, data scraping can induce a breach of fiduciary duties. Finally,
the paper will jointly look at the personal benefit requirement of insider
trading, in case the trader and the information gathering party are not the
same, details of the tippee’s liability and the extent to which scienter plays
into both.
A. Materiality of the Information
1. Basic Rationale
One of the main elements of civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 is that the information in question must have been material.
29
The judicial
standard for materiality of information “there must be a substantial
likelihood that the [ . . . ] fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information.”
30
The courts have previously found that a company’s revenue information
can be material under this standard as a “reasonable inference [can be drawn]
that a reasonable investor would see the obvious connection between
increased revenues and the likelihood of increased profits.”
31
If the
information is, however, only regarding such a small portion of revenue that
it cannot possibly have a meaningful impact on the overall outlook of the
company, it will not be considered material.
32
While the SEC has
the U.S. alone. LouiseMatsakis, TheWIREDGuide to Your Personal Data (andWho Is Using
It), WIRED (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-personal-data-collecti
on/ [https://perma.cc/VP48-B7F3].
29. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (“It shall be unlawful for any person [ . . . ][t]o make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading”).
30. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
31. Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 821 (3d Cir. 1985).
32. In re Westinghouse Sec. Lit., 90 F.3d 696, 714–15 (3d Cir. 1996) (denying
materiality for information on an item on the balance sheet that amounted to only about 0.5%
of the company’s overall revenue).
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commented more broadly that “filling in the ‘interstices in analysis’” should
not give rise to insider trading,
33
the U.S. Supreme Court has found that
suggested distinction “inherently imprecise” and argued that the line should
be drawn as clearly as possible.
34
2. Application in the Digital World
At first sight, scraped data seems too meaningless on its own to be
material: Given that these datasets are often provided as part of a whole
bundle of information – a large majority of which will be of no significant
use whatsoever, let alone prove material –, their singular expressiveness
seems somewhat muted.
35
That first approximation notwithstanding, even information that is only
directly giving insight into a small portion of a corporation’s revenue can be
material when that data set has implications going beyond the revenue
immediately impacted and can be used in conjunction with other (publicly
available) data to reach conclusions that would otherwise not be possible.
That holds true especially since technological advances have made it
possible to piece together information into a cohesive message that would
previously have remained meaningless.
36
In the case of Huang, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit opined that credit card data that
accounted for around 2.4% of overall sales of the retail companies the analyst
then traded on was still likely to be considered material as the analyst in
question used that “data (in tandem with publicly available information) to
predict total revenue information with greater accuracy than analysts using
only publicly available information.”
37
In a similar vein, the U.S. Supreme
Court held in the context of large-scale data accumulation, that a lack of
33. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 659 n.17 (1983) (quote from the SEC briefs).
34. Id.
35. See Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading
After United States v. Newman, 125 YALE L. J. 1482, 1523 (2016) (“The value of information
varies inversely with the number of people who share it, and the rapidity with which that
information is factors into overall markets valuations. [ . . . ] The abundance of other
information further dilute[s] the significance of the information”). With regard to insider
trading risks for hedge funds trading on political intelligence, see Pauley, supra note 2, at 645
(“[B]undling makes it difficult for prosecutors to establish that any one piece of information
is material”).
36. Nicolas H.R. Dumont, Sentiment Analysis & Natural Language: Processing
Techniques for Capital Markets & Disclosure, 25 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 16, 18
(November/December 2017) (commenting on the materiality threshold in the digital age:
“relating what is “material” may be more challenging because counterparties are listening in
a way that most humans never intended”).
37. SEC v. Bonan Huang, 684 F. App’x 167, 172 n.6 (3d Cir. 2017).
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statistical significance does not preclude the information from being
material.
38
This means that courts are unlikely to look too kind on a
defendant arguing that trading on data otherwise falling under the purview
of insider trading laws was only reflective of a holistic analysis where the
data in question only played a minor part in filling out “interstices.”
Especially in cases where outsize returns are attained by the investors,
the courts sometimes also employ basic rationality logic to strengthen the
case for the materiality of the information
39
: In Rothberg, the court arrived
at the materiality finding by basically extrapolating from the point that
“experienced investors” (with hindsight bias, successfully, one needs to add)
acted upon the information.
40
In Huang, the court also conflated the
enormous returns garnered by the investors with the importance of the
information relied upon for those returns.
41
SEC v. Dot9: All three data sets purchased by Dot9 are likely
to be considered material by the courts as the uptick in
customer complaints, the location data focusing on Apple
stores and the statistic regarding the split between
customers who buy something in Apple stores and those
who merely report faults all give the trader a meaningful
informational advantage over the average investor. Only
with regard to the location data could one argue that the
mere trend in foot traffic is not by itself notable. A
decrease in foot traffic could also mean less customers
lodging complaints in person and/or more online
38. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 43 (2011) (“Given that
medical professionals and regulators act on the basis of evidence of causation that is not
statistically significant, it stands to reason that in certain cases reasonable investors would as
well.”).
39. See also INTEGRITYRESEARCHASSOCS., MITIGATINGLEGALRISKSASSOCIATED WITH
ALTERNATIVEDATA 9 (January 2018), https://www.integrity-research.com/wp-content/uploa
ds/2018/01/Mitigating-Legal-Risks-Alternative-Data-January-2018-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V69S-NV7T] (“Alpha-generating information is by definition material. Insider trading
prosecutions are all ex-post, allowing prosecutors to focus only on successful trades, and the
more successful the trade the more attractive it is to a prosecutor.”).
40. See Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 821 (3d Cir. 1985) (“The best proof of
the materiality of [ . . . ] information [regarding sales orders] is that [ . . . ] experienced
investors found it to be sufficiently material to form the joint venture and to purchase stock
when it was depressed in price”).
41. See SEC v. Bonan Huang, 684 F. App’x 167, 173 (3d Cir. 2017) (“As reflected by
Huang’s own investment decisions, which [ . . . ] resulted in a 12,929% three-year return on
his investment, the nonpublic Capital One data “significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information” in the eyes of a reasonable investor.”).
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purchases.
42
Only together with additional information
(the internal Apple store statistics) does the data
unequivocally support the “shorting” of Apple stock.
Given the fact that foot traffic trends can likely be at least
a statistically significant proxy for sales trends and
therefore would likely seem material to a reasonable
investor
43
, the more than twentyfold return on investment,
and the courts’ unwillingness to entertain the notion that
information that factually lead someone to make a
significant investment which yielded outsize returns was
somehow immaterial, such an argument seems unlikely to
prevail at trial.
B. Non-Public Nature of the Information
1. Basic Rationale
As a baseline that seems obvious, but is worth repeating here,
considering the question at hand revolves around the possible illegality of
trading on data essentially gathered off the Internet, it is “axiomatic that
trading on public information does not violate Section 10(b).”
44
Information
can become public if it is released in a manner that is “designed to achieve a
broad dissemination to the investing public generally and without favoring
any special person or group.”
45
Ordinarily, that means information is public
“if it is available to the public through SEC filings, the media, or other
sources.”
46
Even if only a small number of people know of the information,
the information is to be considered public if “their trading has caused the
information to be fully impounded into the price of the particular stock” as
this renders any market abuse impossible since there are no more
42. See Brandon Kochkodin, Parking Lots Don’t Tell the Whole Story: The Trouble With
Alternative Data, BLOOMBERG (November 29, 2018), https://www.bloomberg. com/news/arti
cles/2018-11-29/the-trouble-with-using-alternative-data-to-gain-an-investing-edge [https://p
erma.cc/6DDF-KGAC] (quoting John Chisholm, Co-CEO at Acadian Asset Management:
“How consistently does foot traffic translate into retail sales? And even if it does, is the
earnings impact already discounted by analysts?).
43. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988) (“[M]ateriality depends on the
significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented
information”).
44. United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993).
45. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 653–54 n.12 (1983).
46. United States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2012).
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(illegitimate) profits to be reaped.
47
2. Non-Public Nature of Aggregated Public Information?
In relation to trading done by hedge funds, it is fair to assume that the
information will most likely not have been “impounded into the price of the
particular stock”
48
as there would – from the perspective of the resourceful,
evaluating and value-maximizing individual
49
– be no profit (i.e. alpha) in
trading on the information in that case.
50
One could, however, argue that a
lot of the information is broadly disseminated to the public as scraping
usually involves the search of public domains.
51
Even though the specific
dataset gathered and arranged may not be available to the public – as the
value-add of data analytics lies specifically in arranging the information in
such a way that meaningful conclusions can be drawn from it that weren’t
discernible before
52
– the source of the information, i.e. theWorldWideWeb
in many instances, was and is publicly available. The question then becomes
whether the information – as information overload is a common feature
nowadays and even considered a potential threat to disclosure obligations
53
47. United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993).
48. Id.
49. For more details on the REMmodel, see Michael C. Jensen &William H. Meckling,
The Nature of Man, 7 J. APPLIEDCORP. FIN. 4, 7–10 (Summer 1994).
50. Another area in which the non-public nature of information is debated, is with regards
to data gathered through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, as the availability of
such information depends on both a prior request and the payment of a fee. Caroline Banton,
5 Ways to Make Money That Should Be Illegal, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER ,Apr. 13, 2016,
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/business/5_Ways_to_Make_Money_That_Should_Be_Ille
gal.html [https://perma.cc/392X-KEJP] (quoting Max Galka, a derivatives trader mapping
FOIA requests: “I use the term ‘not publicly known’ rather than ‘nonpublic’ because
technically the information is public, and trading on it is legal. However, since the information
is only obtainable using the Freedom of Information Act, for all intents and purposes, it is
nonpublic information.”). Hedge Funds account for a nontrivial percentage of FOIA request.
Max Galka,Who Uses FOIA? – An Analysis of 229,000 Requests to 85 Government Agencies,
FOIAMAPPER, Mar. 13, 2017, https://foiamapper.com/who-uses-foia/ [https://perma.cc/6QX
6-DNG5].
51. Egan, supra note 3 (“[S]trategy as it’s intended does not involve using confidential
information.”).
52. See Crane, Crotty & Umar, supra note 3, at 19 (commenting on the outcome of an
abnormal-returns study on hedge fund: “Overall, these results are consistent with hedge fund
possessing private information about upcoming events for firms and researching the firms
ahead of the public revelation of this information.”); Egan, supra note 3 (quoting Justin Zhen,
co-founder of Thinknum, an alternative data provider: “It’s a way for investors to almost spy
on management”).
53. See ELSIE HENDERSON, USERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT NOTE
DISCLOSURE AND THE THEORY OF INFORMATION OVERLOAD 115 (ProQuest Dissertations
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– can be thought of as public only because its underlying data could be
accessed piecemeal by the general public.
(a) First Approximation
There is no case law on the specific question of whether scraped data is
considered non-public under insider trading law and the ever-changing
nature of technology makes doubling down on an abstract answer difficult.
54
Therefore, the most convincing argument is likely to prevail at trial. While
the emphasis on the public origin of the scraped data has some superficial
appeal, it seems more sensible to qualify the aggregated data set a new piece
of information that was not previously available. In today’s ubiquity of data,
purposefully gathering data and distilling it to a set that actually conveys a
message to the surveyor that the amorphous array of material were not (yet)
able to articulate, is a skill so material that it warrants classifying the
aggregation as a novel piece of information.
55
(b) Comparison with EU Legislation
This line of reasoning, which is a product of both technological progress
in the field of data analysis and the growing deluge of publicly accessible
Publishing 2016) (“Transparency must always be an overarching component of disclosures.
As standard setters work to improve financial statement note disclosures more emphasis must
be placed on providing succinct disclosures and reducing disclosures adding little value to
users through a clearer expectation of the application of materiality. Users need to understand
more disclosure does not mean better disclosure or greater transparency, in fact more could
cause users to lose sight [of] significant information.”); Ricarda Moll, Stefanie Pischl &
Rainer Bromme, Whoever will read it – The overload heuristic in collective privacy
expectations, 75 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 484, 485 (2017) (“When people are confronted
with more information than they can actually process, information tends to be perceived as
noise, namely redundant or meaningless information that interferes with the goals or expected
signals of the receiving person”).
54. SeeWieczner, supra note 3 (quoting Daniel Hawke, former chief of the SEC’s market
abuse unit: “In a world where information travels very, very fast and through different media,
figuring out whether information is public or not is challenging. . . .”).
55. See Enrico Colombatto & Valerio Tavormina, Regulating information flows: Is it
just? Insider Trading and mandatory-disclosure rules from a free-market perspective, 46
EUR. J. L. ECON. 205, 214 (2018) (referencing a “Lockean claim in favour of exclusive
property rights” for data analysis); Crane, Crotty & Umar, supra note 3, at 2 n.3 (“Note that
private information is not necessarily illegal insider information but could instead stem from
hard-to-get or costly data sources (e.g., satellite data, mobile phone data). . . .”). See also
DELOITTE CTR. FOR FIN. SERV., supra note 3, at 7 (“[A]n important lesson for IM firms to
consider is that regulators are taking note of alternative data, and the common definitions of
public and private information are in transition. . . .”).
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information, can arguably be backed up by a comparison with the evolution
of EU regulation on the topic: Whereas the original EU Directive on insider
trading explicitly, and without any qualification or caveats, exempted trades
based on “research and estimates developed from publicly available
sources”
56
, the revamped Regulation on this topic now cautions traders that
thusly derived information is “not per se” inside information leading to
insider trading liability and advises investors, rather vaguely, one might add,
to “consider the extent to which the information is non-public and the
possible effect on financial instruments traded in advance of its publication
or distribution, to establish whether they would be trading on the basis of
inside information.”
57
This explicit backtracking on the question of whether
information derived from publicly available data can be inside (i.e.
nonpublic) information on the part of the EU legislature shows that this is
less of an open-and-shut case than previously thought.
(c) Role of Exclusivity Agreements
As reported by the Financial Times, the Chief Market Intelligence
Office of Point72, a hedge fund based in New York, said in response to a
question at a student panel as to how Big Data was helping hedge funds get
an alpha-edge when everyone has access to the same information: “The great
thing about this area is you can arrange deals where you are the only ones
who get it.”
58
More specifically, he was referring to exclusivity agreements
with the data vendors. Since a lot of data distribution companies are pitching
56. Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January
2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 1, 18
(“Research and estimates developed from publicly available data should not be regarded as
inside information and, therefore, any transaction carried out on the basis of such research or
estimates should not be deemed in itself to constitute insider dealing within the meaning of
this Directive.”).
57. Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC,
2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 1, 7–8 (“Research and estimates based on
publicly available data, should not per se be regarded as inside information and the mere fact
that a transaction is carried out on the basis of research or estimates should not therefore be
deemed to constitute use of inside information. . . . Market actors must therefore consider the
extent to which the information is non-public and the possible effect on financial instruments
traded in advance of its publication or distribution, to establish whether they would be trading
on the basis of inside information.”)
58. Lindsay Fortado, RobinWigglesworth &Kara Scannell,Hedge funds see a gold rush
in data mining, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d86a d460-88
02-11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787 [https://perma.cc/3HAD-ZH7Y].
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to hedge funds to purchase large data sets, many hedge funds will only agree
to contract if there is an exclusivity agreement in place with regard to the
specific data sold, as “alternative data” is perceived to be the “next big thing”
in generating alpha, which means there is an innate desire on the part of
hedge funds to restrict access to such data sets.
59
SEC v. Dot9: Through exclusivity agreements with DataPortal,
Dot9 protected and perpetuated the private (i.e. non-
public) nature of the data. Those exclusivity agreements
emphasize the scarcity of the aggregated data sets and
therefore their non-public nature.
60
(d) Prognosis
Better erring on the side of caution in trying to predict the destination
of a moving target, investment managers should assume that the SEC might
prevail with the argument that scraping and further analysis are capable of
creating a new, non-public piece of information. Policy concerns regarding
the possible overreach of the insider trading laws appear unwarranted at this
stage as the breach of fiduciary duty and the scienter element – additional
hurdles for an insider trading case to clear in the U.S. that the EU regulation
on insider trading, for example, does not demand in this form
61
– remains as
a (meaningful) restriction on the applicability of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.
59. See CITI BUS. ADVISORY SERVS., BIG DATA & INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT: THE
POTENTIAL TOQUANTIFY TRADITIONALLYQUALITATIVE FACTORS 17 (October 7, 2019 12:49
PM), https://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/big-data-investment-management-the-pote
ntial-to-quantify-traditionally-qualitative-factors.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Q9S-HYWK]
(describing “growing number of instances where a provider is looking to supply data to a sole
or limited set of users at significant price premiums”); Crane, Crotty & Umar, supra note 3,
at 26 (“We investigate whether the positive relation between performance and public
information acquisition is due to hedge funds being superior information processors or if it is
due them public information in conjunction with private signals about firm values. Several
analyses suggest the latter channel is the predominant source of the relation.”), 2–3, n.3 (“Note
that private information . . . could . . . stem from hard-to-get or costly data sources (e.g.,
satellite data, mobile phone data). . . .”).
60. See INTEGRITYRESEARCHASSOCS., supra note 39, at 8 (“Insider trading risks . . . can
be heightened by exclusivity agreements.”).
61. SeeMerritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten &Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Informed Trading
and its Regulation, 43 J. CORP. L. 817, 886–87 (2018) (“[T]he Directive is not hobbled by the
personal benefit rule test nor does it require a showing of knowledge by the trader of a prior
breach of some duty. . . .”).
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SEC v. Dot9: The data gathered off of customerreviews.com is
publicly available. That opens the door for the argument
that – even though its content is undisputedly not
“impounded” into the current price of Apple stock as it
does not yet reflect the disappointing business outlook
revealed in the 10-Q – the underlying information is
already accessible by the public. The SEC might argue
that the scraping process created a dataset that was so
different from the breadth of customer reviews previously
accessible, that it gave rise to new information which, in
the hands of its creators, became non-public data. Given
the ubiquity of information in the digital age, the molding
of data into a cohesive novel set likely created a “new”
piece of information under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The private nature of the information was even
emphasized by the purchase price and the exclusivity
agreement that Dot9 and DataPortal agreed on (why else
would one want to pay for and protect exclusive access to
a dataset if the information is already considered public?).
The data used to disseminate proportions of buying versus
complaint-lodging customers originates from inside
Apple and is therefore non-public in all aspects. Finally,
the location data was initially only gathered by the
proprietor of LocalCookBook and was therefore never
public.
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty as a Restriction on Insider Trading
Doctrine
1. Basic Rationale
Insider trading liability can rest on either one of two separate doctrines:
Under the classical theory of insider-trading liability, the duty breach occurs
with respect to the shareholders of the defendant’s corporation when a
corporate insider or his tippee trade securities of that company on the basis
of material, non-public information about said entity.
62
If there is no
62. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 n.2 (2016). See, for example, the two
factual components in a recent SEC civil complaint alleging that Apple’s in-house chief
corporate lawyer traded on information in violation of his duty to shareholders: “1. As a Senior
Attorney andMember of Apple’s Disclosure Committee, Levoff Was Entrusted withMaterial
Nonpublic Information”; “2. At the Time of His Trading, Apple Had Taken Steps to Prevent
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company insider involved, insider trading liability can arise under the so-
called misappropriation theory when someone misappropriates information
gleaned from a source which the person owes a fiduciary duty to, the
illegality of later trading notionally resting on the “fiduciary-turned-trader’s
deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential
information.”
63
When – as described in the hypothetical of SEC v. Dot9 – the party
ultimately executing the securities trade (in this scenario, the tippee) is
receiving the information from another person (referred to as the tipper), the
duty breach must originally occur between the tipper and either his corporate
employer (under the classical theory) or the party that the tipper owes
fiduciary responsibilities to (under the misappropriation theory).
64
SEC v. Dot9: DataPortal owed a fiduciary duty to its client,
Apple, to keep all proprietary information it received from
Apple in the course of their business relationship secret
and not disclose it to outsiders. By including the statistic
regarding the split between Apple store customers who
buy and those who just “complain” in their data
aggregation sold to Dot9, DataPortal violated said
fiduciary duty.
2. Necessity of a Fiduciary Breach in the Context of Scraping?
Having established that a fiduciary breach is generally necessary to
justify a finding of insider trading liability, the quandary remains whether
that holds true in the context of data scraping as well.
(a) The Case of Dorozhko
Namely, in the case of Dorozhko, the Second Circuit found that no
precedent existed that prevented it from equating a deceptive hack with an
affirmative misrepresentation that made further findings on the existence of
Employees, Such as Levoff, from Trading on Material Nonpublic Information.” SEC v. Gene
Daniel Levoff, 2019 WL 630326 (D.N.J.) (No. 2:19-5536).
63. SeeUnited States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652, 656 (1997) (“[M]isappropriator . . .
gains his advantageous market position through deception; he deceives the source of the
information and simultaneously harms members of the investing public.”).
64. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 n.23 (1983) (“Only if there was such a breach
[i.e., of the tipper’s fiduciary responsibilities towards his employer and the shareholders of
said employer] did Dirks, a tippee, acquire a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain.”).
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a fiduciary duty unnecessary.
65
The case has generated significant discussion
around the necessity of a fiduciary breach requirement for technological data
extraction.
66
While the necessary degree of relationship between insider
trading and the ever-changing chameleon of fiduciary obligations poses an
intriguing question from an academic perspective,
67
the case of Dorozhko
remains an outlier in U.S. case law on insider trading.
68
Even in the case that
was decided, the court left open the question as to whether the hacking at
hand constituted affirmatively deceptive behavior that supposedly suffices
for the stretched definition of insider trading.
69
Given the factual difficulty
that arises when one is to apply the term of deception – a concept that would
65. See S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he SEC argues that
defendant affirmatively misrepresented himself in order to gain access to material, nonpublic
information, which he then used to trade. We are aware of no precedent of the Supreme Court
or our Court that forecloses or prohibits the SEC’s straightforward theory of fraud. Absent a
controlling precedent that “deceptive” has a more limited meaning than its ordinary meaning,
we see no reason to complicate the enforcement of Section 10(b) by divining new
requirements.”).
66. SeeAbrahamC. Bloomenstiel, Proprietary Data Feed and Colocation-Enabled High
Frequency Trading: Troubling Paradoxes and Difficult Truths, 45 SEC. REG. L.J. 147, 157
(2017) (finding that “duty-based approaches to insider trading may be eroding”); Brian A.
Karol, Deception Absent Duty: Computer Hackers & Section 10(B) Liability, 19 U. MIAMI
BUS. L. REV. 185, 196 (2011) (“At least two federal circuit courts are split on the issue of
whether the Supreme Court has authoritatively construed Section 10(b) to require a breach of
a fiduciary duty for any “device” to be “deceptive”.); Elizabeth A. Odian, SEC v Dorozhko’s
Affirmative Misrepresentation Theory of Insider Trading: An Improper Means to a Proper
End, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1313, 1333 (2011) (“new theory of insider [ . . . ] that substitutes the
longstanding fiduciary duty requirement with a test for common law fraud”). See also Eric
C. Chaffee, The Supreme Court as Museum Curator: Securities Regulation and the Roberts
Court, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 847, 885–86 (2017) (“[Supreme] Court in Dirks
acknowledged that deception is at the core of an insider trading violation, rather than a breach
of fiduciary duty”).
67. See Chaffee, supra note 66, at 887 (“[D]eception based theory of insider trading is
also more in keeping with the history and intent of Rule 10b-5”).
68. See Don Butterworth, SEC v. Dorozhko: Alternative Data, Web Scraping, and 10(b)
Fraud, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2019), https://journals.library.columbia.edu/i
ndex.php/CBLR/announcement/view/198 [https://perma.cc/Z47D-7P46] (“In the nearly ten
years since Dorozhko, no court has taken up the challenge of determining the extent of
potential liability for “outsider traders” who fraudulently misrepresent their identities to
obtain MNPI.”). For a critical view towards the status quo of (Supreme Court) precedents in
this area, see Chaffee, supra note 66, at 885: “Considering how much fiduciary duty law has
evolved since Dirks and how much it is likely to evolve in the future, one must wonder why
the Roberts Court continues to build on this unstable foundation for insider trading
regulation.”
69. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Having established that the
SEC need not demonstrate a breach of fiduciary duty, we now remand to the District Court to
consider, in the first instance, whether the computer hacking in this case involved a fraudulent
misrepresentation that was “deceptive” within the ordinary meaning of Section 10(b).”).
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seem to presuppose, at a minimum, the ability to think (if not free thought)
– to a machine-based algorithm,
70
this standard will give little insight into
what courts might to with it in the future. So it really all depends on the
specificities of the hack as well as the deciding court.
71
(b) The Limited Impact of Dorozhko
Even if one were to accept the notion that hacking obviates the need for
the finding of a fiduciary breach,
72
the question still remains whether that
precedent at all applies to data scraping practices. A definitive answer to that
question would require a technical analysis of the scraping practice at hand
that can and should not be anticipated without a fact pattern in mind.
Generally, however, while there might some overlaps between hacking and
scraping whenever the scraping process is preceded by a security breach –
since, technically, every hack with the intent to glean information from a
system is followed by an informational scrape of some sort –, for the most
part scraping should be hack-free. The scraping process is predicated on
grabbing information off of publicly available sources, rendering any system
breach unnecessary. Whether automated scraping is in compliance with a
system’s terms of use – which may oftentimes be questionable, especially if
the availability of that information for the general public is factually limited
to highly sophisticated tech professionals who “know where to look” – is not
the same issue as whether that process constitutes hacking, the latter clearly
implying the forced entry into a closed-circuit system or the intentional
circumvention of technological barriers through the technological equivalent
of force.
73
In scraping scenarios where it might be applicable and one would
rely on Dorozhko as the leading case in this area, the scraping process would
nevertheless need to be affirmatively deceptive – as this is the only precedent
70. While the literature is torn on whether computers can “think” or not, the surest way
to legitimize the term of “deception” in this context would be to extend personhood – already
granted to corporations by the U.S. Supreme Court – to computers. See Farid Sharaby,
Computer Hacking as a “Deceptive Device”: Why the Courts Must Give Computers Legal
Consciousness to Hold Hackers Liable for Insider Trading, 42 MCGEORGEL. REV. 929, 941–
53 (2011).
71. See Karol, supra note 66, at 214 (“Courts have not clarified whether computer
hacking is “inherently deceptive”, as the SEC alleges, or if only certain types of hacking are
deceptive.”).
72. See Karol, supra note 66, at 206 (“may now be possible for non-fiduciaries to violate
Section 10(b)’s prohibition”).
73. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[A]n anonymous computer
hacker attempted to gain access to the IMS earnings report by hacking into a secure server at
Thomson prior to the report’s official release”).
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Dorozhko has actually set with regard to a softening of the “fiduciary
breach”-requirement
74
–, meaning it has to satisfy a somewhat vague
standard
75
of technological fraud. Thus, the infamous precedent ofDorozhko
currently has limited impact on the general necessity of a fiduciary breach.
76
3. Website Scraping as a Fiduciary Breach?
Another question is whether data that is gathered under violation of the
Terms of Use of a website fulfils the requirement of information gleaned
(and subsequently either used for trading purposes or transmitted to a third
party for said purpose) in breach of a fiduciary duty. In this scenario, the
data will usually not have originated from a corporate insider, meaning
insider trading liability can only arise under the misappropriation theory.
Outlawing a trade under that theory rests on the notion, however, that
“undisclosed misappropriation of [ . . . ] information, in violation of a
fiduciary duty, [ . . . ] constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement.”
77
Therefore,
to hold someone liable under insider trading law for accessing outwardly
public information on a website, the use of that website with a scraping
algorithm must somehow be qualified as deceptive as that is the underlying
rationale of Section 10(b).
(a) Terms of Use as Fiduciary Relationship?
One way to potentially do that would be to equate a website’s terms of
use – that oftentimes bar the commercial harvesting of its content
78
– with a
fiduciary relationship between the user and the operator of a webpage. If,
for example, a Venmo user exploits a loophole in the app and its website to
74. See Bloomenstiel, supra note 66, at 158 (calling Dorozhko an “expansion of the legal
theory underlying insider trading”).
75. Butterworth, supra note 68 (“The Second Circuit…offered only some cryptic
guidance”); Karol, supra note 66, at 206 (“[The] breadth of the meaning of ‘deceptive’ under
Section 10(b) still remains unclear”).
76. Similar conclusion drawn by Bloomenstiel, supra note 66, at 158. “Though the 2nd
Circuit’s holding in Dorozhko weakens breach-of-duty as an essential element for insider
trading liability, it does not signal a retreat to an “information parity” approach to insider
trading.” Id.
77. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997).
78. E.g. Clause 8.2.(b) ofUser Agreement, LINKEDIN (last updated Jan. 6, 2020), https://
www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement?trk=homepage-basic_footer-user-agreement#dos
[https://perma.cc/BTJ3-3QF2] (“You agree that you will not: [ . . . ] Develop, support or use
software, devices, scripts, robots, or any other means or processes (including crawlers,
browser plugins and add-ons, or any other technology) to scrape the Services or otherwise
copy profiles and other data from the Services”).
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scrape detailed, though anonymous, transaction data for millions of
transactions,
79
that behavior will most likely be in violation of some term of
use.
80
Even though no insider trading was at stake here, LinkedIn has tried
to argue something similar when it (unsuccessfully) tried to shut out a data
analytics firm that scraped its public page in breach of its explicit will for the
purpose of compiling data on a companies’ most “volatile” (i.e. likely to
leave) employees.
81
The case of LinkedIn – that was recently decided in
hiQ’s favor by the Ninth Circuit
82
– has garnered close attention from hedge
funds which are worried that one of their prime sources for alpha-generating
trading information – public webpages ripe for a scraping algorithm – might
be cordoned off in the future.
83
79. A computer science student has successfully managed to do so. See Salmon, supra
note 27 (documenting an individual scraping transaction data off of Venmo).
80. See User Agreement,Restricted Activities, VENMO (last updated Jan. 27, 2020), https:
//venmo.com/legal/us-user-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/5A77-VNAE] (“In connection with
your use of our websites, your Venmo account, the Venmo services, or in the course of your
interactions with us, other customers, or third parties, youmust not [ . . . ] Use an anonymizing
proxy; use any robot, spider, other automatic device, or manual process to monitor or copy
our websites without our prior written permission”).
81. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d
and remanded, No. 17-16783, 2019 WL 4251889 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2019) (“[W]hile the
information that hiQ seeks to collect is publicly viewable, the posting of changes to a profile
may raise the risk that a current employee may be rated as having a higher risk of flight under
Keeper even though the employee chose the Do Not Broadcast setting. hiQ could also make
data from users available even after those users have removed it from their profiles or deleted
their profiles altogether. LinkedIn argues that both it and its users therefore face substantial
harm absent an injunction; if hiQ is able to continue its data collection unabated, LinkedIn
members’ privacy may be compromised, and the company will suffer a corresponding loss of
consumer trust and confidence.”).
82. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 17-16783, 2019 WL 4251889 (9th Cir. Sept.
9, 2019).
83. Bradley Saacks, Hedge funds are watching key lawsuit involving LinkedIn to see if
they can spend billions on web-scraped data, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 14, 2019), https://ww
w.businessinsider.com/hedge-funds-watching-linkedin-lawsuit-on-web-scraped-data-2019-3
[https://perma.cc/D8UH-FT7A]; Tristan Greene, We should be getting paid to use Facebook
and Google, TNW (Mar. 9, 2018), https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2018/03/09/
we-should-be-getting-paid-to-use-facebook-and-google/ [https://perma.cc/DP5H-USPP]
(“could have huge implications throughout the technology world”); Tony Hughes, Moody’s
Analytics Economist: Why the LinkedIn Data Case Is a Lose-Lose Situation, FORTUNE (Mar.
16, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/03/16/linkedin-hiq-labs-data-case/ [https://perma.cc/LD
E5-486M] (“[E]specially cruel choice in cases like this. We canmake our data freely available
and have no one bother to collect it. Or, we can bestow ownership rights on the data and
potentially miss out on beneficial insights gleaned from its analysis.”).
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(b) Terms of Use as Access Restriction?
Considering the ubiquity of potential users, one could question whether
using a publicly accessible website in any shape or form that does not involve
hacking the website’s security’s protocol
84
can breach a fiduciary
relationship between user and usee
85
: The mere presence of technological
barriers against bot-centric scraping such as CAPTCHA-technology (“to
verify that you are not a robot”) does not automatically remove the content
from the public sphere, i.e. such scraping does not, in and of itself, constitute
unauthorized access, for example, under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA).
86
Those doubts are reinforced by the fact that even for members of
84. The act of hacking––e.g. giving a computer system, through technological deception,
the false impression that one is “authorized” to access data––is in itself deceptive, rendering
further inquiries into fiduciary breaches arguably superfluous. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d
42, 49–51 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court left open whether “exploiting a weakness in an electronic
code to gain unauthorized access is ‘deceptive’, rather than being mere theft.” For further
analysis on the Second Circuit’s definition of ‘deceptive’ and whether that meshes with the
current Supreme Court precedents, see Karol, supra note 66, at 214. For a current factual
example, see Indictment at 6, U.S. v. Artem Radchenko and Oleksandr Ieremenko,
2018R01347 / DS (D.C. N.J.), https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/press-release/file/1124251/do
wnload [https://perma.cc/W7GW-F5AN]. “It was part of the conspiracy that the defendants
and others gained unauthorized access to the computer networks of the SEC by employing a
variety of hacking methods, including directory traversal attacks and phishing attacks. The
co-conspirators took steps to conceal and misrepresent their identities to illegally gain access
to information on the internal networks of the SEC and to avoid detection.” Id.
85. For a first approximation in the words of former SEC Commissioner Roberta S.
Karmel, see Roberta S. Karmel The Fiduciary Principle of Insider Trading Needs Revision,
56 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 121, 130 (2018). “[A] hacker is not anyone’s fiduciary….” Id.
86. See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 17-16783, 2019 WL 4251889, at 14 (9th
Cir. Sept. 9, 2019) (“[I]t appears that the CFAA’s prohibition on accessing a computer
“without authorization” is violated when a person circumvents a computer’s generally
applicable rules regarding access permissions, such as username and password requirements,
to gain access to a computer. It is likely that when a computer network generally permits
public access to its data, a user’s accessing that publicly available data will not constitute
access without authorization under the CFAA. The data hiQ seeks to access is not owned by
LinkedIn and has not been demarcated by LinkedIn as private using such an authorization
system.”); hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1113 (“hiQ’s
circumvention of LinkedIn’s measures to prevent use of bots and implementation of IP
address blocks does not violate the CFAA because hiQ accessed only publicly viewable data
not protected by an authentication gateway”); Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 27
(D.D.C. 2018) (“Employing a bot to crawl a website or apply for jobs may run afoul of a
website’s ToS, but it does not constitute an access violation when the human who creates the
bot is otherwise allowed to read and interact with that site.”). See Facebook, Inc. v. Power
Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1068 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Simply bypassing an IP address,
without more, would not constitute unauthorized use.”); Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. Prestige
Entm’t W., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (“To be clear, it is the violation
of the terms of the Letter, not of Ticketmaster’s Terms of Use, on which the Court bases its
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Congress – their a priori fiduciary relationship to the public at large being
somewhat more easily justifiable due to an implicit function as trustees for
the public good – the legislature saw the need to explicitly provide for such
a fiduciary relationship via the STOCK Act of 2012
87
to combat the dangers
of the burgeoning profession of lobbyism. Thus, even if the terms of use of
a website bar scraping or any other commercial use of information presented
on the site or its operating procedure tries to do so via technological means,
it remains unclear whether courts would be willing to equate that with the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between operator and user.
88
In
answering this difficult question, one should rely on the basic rationale
behind barring insider trading, which is to prevent fraud on the market
89
to
preserve investors’ faith in the institutional integrity of capital markets
90
–
and such fraud is simply not at stake in this scenario. If a website operator
decides to run a public forum for greater visibility and does not implement
any authentication gateway or explicitly restrict the access of a user found to
be in violation of his terms of use
91
– which would undoubtedly be both
within his rights and his capabilities – accessing said content in any way,
shape or form (i.e. even via a scraping algorithm outsmarting CAPTCHA-
technology) simply does result in deceit, as it has to be within the expected
(disapproved of, it may be) behavior of users.
92
finding of a well-pled CFAA claim.”).
87. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
105; 126 Stat. 291.
88. See S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[U]nclear, however, that
exploiting a weakness in an electronic code to gain unauthorized access is ‘deceptive,’ rather
than being mere theft.”); United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016)
(Refusing to equate a circumvention of a website’s terms of use with a CFAA violation:
“violating use restrictions, like a website’s terms of use, is insufficient without more to form
the basis for liability under the CFAA.”).
89. SeeBasic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988) (“It is not inappropriate to apply
a presumption of reliance supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory.”).
90. See Karmel, supra note 85, at 134 (“[T]he ban on insider trading is important to
investor confidence in the markets.”).
91. SeeCraigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[The]
average person does not use ‘anonymous proxies’ to bypass an IP block set up to enforce a
banning communicated via personally-addressed cease-and-desist letter.”).
92. For behavior that might rise to a fraudulent representation in the digital world, see
BLUERIVER PARTNERS, ANNUALCOMPLIANCEUPDATE 10 (2018), http://www.blueriver partn
ersllc.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2017-Year-End-Update-FINAL-01.08.18.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/4Q4Y-NLTF]; “[A] potentially deceptive practice may include a data provider’s
use of web scraping to gather information while disregarding or evading a website’s security
protocols.” Id.; Robert G. Leonard, Jeffrey D. Neuburger & Joshua M. Newville, Best
Practices for Private Fund Advisers to Manage the Risks of Big Data and Web Scraping,
HEDGE FUNDL. REP. (June 15, 2017), https://www.hfla wreport.com/2552996/best-practices-
for-private-fund-advisers-to-manage-the-risks-of-big-data-and-web-scraping.thtml [https://p
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(c) Violation of Terms of Use as Deceptive Behavior?
The boilerplate acquiescence to contractual terms of use upon entering
a site can and should not be equated with an affirmative representation that
any and all such terms will be honored in the future, thereby exaggeratedly
superimposing fiduciary breaches for the purposes of insider trading doctrine
on any run-of-the-mill contract breach: Subsequent contractual breaches
should not automatically imply fraudulent inducement in entering into an
agreement in the first place.
93
Doing so would, viewed in a larger, doctrinal
context, greatly endanger contractual stability as every agreement would be
hanging in the balance as long as breaches are still possible, since such a
breach would then serve as proof of earlier fraudulent inducement. The site
proprietor may have tried to limit the re-use of the information he displayed
but he never envisioned that certain individuals would be cut off entirely
from his data,
94
i.e. he likely would not feel deceived through DataPortal
accessing his site from the perspective of a reasonable bystander.
95
Policy
erma.cc/Y987-8HLY] (“Circumventing security protocols; disguising or failing to reveal a
scraper’s identity on a site (where required); and simulating human transactions, among other
behaviors, each could be viewed as an affirmative misrepresentation”).
93. But see Butterworth, supra note 68 (“[A] potentially deceptive tactic occurs when a
webscraper, in exchange for access to website information, agrees to terms and conditions
which prohibit scraping activities.”); Sanaea Daruwell, Navigating Compliance When
Extracting Web Scraped Alternative Financial Data, THE SCRAPINGHUB BLOG (Mar. 21,
2019), https://blog.scrapinghub.com/regulatory-compliance-for-alternative-web-scraped-fina
ncial-data [https://perma.cc/7PJ2-3DMA] (“If the terms state that you may not scrape the site
or use automated means to extract data from the site, your web scraping project may not only
[!] give rise to insider information issues, but also to breach of contract claims.”).
94. See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1002 (9th Cir. 2019)
(“[U]nderstanding that the CFAA is premised on a distinction between information
presumptively accessible to the general public and information for which authorization is
generally required”).
95. See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1070 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“Violation of Facebook’s terms of use, without more, would not be sufficient to impose
liability. Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 862–63. But, in addition to asserting a violation of Facebook’s
terms of use, the cease and desist letter warned Power that it may have violated federal and
state law and plainly put Power on notice that it was no longer authorized to access Facebook’s
computers.”); hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F.Supp.3d 1099, 1113 n.9 (“[W]hen a
business displays a sign in a storefront window for the public to view, it may not prohibit on
pain of trespass a viewer from photographing that sign or viewing it with glare reducing
sunglasses.”); Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 27 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The website might
purport to be limiting the identities of those entitled to enter the site, so that humans but not
robots can get in. See Star Wars: Episode IV—A New Hope (Lucasfilm 1977) (‘We don’t
serve their kind here! . . . Your droids. They’ll have to wait outside.’). But bots are simply
technological tools for humans to more efficiently collect and process information that they
could otherwise access manually. See StarWars: Episode II—Attack of the Clones (Lucasfilm
2002) (‘[I]f droids could think, there’d be none of us here, would there?’).”).
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concerns regarding the looming ineffectiveness of a website’s terms of use
are to be heeded, but are misplaced within the insider trading doctrine:
Enforcing terms of use of a public domain is not the job of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, but rather a task to be brought about by ordinary contract and
tort law.
96
SEC v. Dot9: DataPortal scraped customerreviews.com in contravention
of the website’s terms of use. In addition, its scraping algorithm was
able to circumvent the CAPTCHA-technology that was primarily
designed to keep bots off of the webpage. Both may well be
actionable from LocalCookBook’s point of view with regard to
DataPortal
97
, but the disclosure of the scraped data set to Dot9 is not
a violation of DataPortal’s fiduciary duties towards LocalCookBook
(if there even are any) as the access is not “unauthorized” under the
CFAA and therefore likely not based on deceit under the insider
trading doctrine.
96. See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1004 (“We note that entities that
view themselves as victims of data scraping are not without resort, even if the CFAA does not
apply: state law trespass to chattels claims may still be available. And other causes of action,
such as copyright infringement, misappropriation, unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of
contract, or breach of privacy, may also lie.”); ebay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp.
2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (equating scraping in contravention of a “robots.txt”-
restriction with digital trespass with regard to the resulting server load); Sw. Airlines Co. v.
Roundpipe, LLC, 375 F. Supp. 3d. 687, 706 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (“[The] court concludes that
Southwest’s complaint states a plausible claim for breach of contract because Southwest’s
complaint not only identifies the existence of a valid contract (Southwest’s use agreement)
but it also explains how the defendants’ use of automated scraping tools breached the contract
and caused damage to Southwest”). See also Joshua A. T. Fairfield, “Do-Not-Track” as
Contract, 14 VAND. J. ENT. AND TECH. L. 545, 582 (2012) (“Likewise, when one website
wishes to exclude robots and scrapers from its service, the website posts a file called
“robots.txt” that includes the restrictions on scraping. These restrictions are readable by other
people’s scrapers and agents, and are quite binding: if the scraper continues despite the
preferences expressed in the robots.txt file, courts have analogized the resulting server load
to trespassing on someone’s land without permission. Thus, automated contracts are
enforced.”); Hirschey, supra note 26, at 918 (“[A] data host should only exercise these legal
options if scrapers seek to challenge the data host’s business model parasitically and not to
augment it mutualistically”); Leonard, Neuburger & Newville, supra note 92 (“Violation of
the EULA [i.e. end-user license agreements] by, for example, scraping information has been
used successfully as the basis for breach-of-contract claims.”). See Horton, supra note 11, at
8 (noting that given the unlikelihood of pursuing these claims, violating the terms of use is a
“business risk that a lot of managers may be willing to take”).
97. See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1004 n.15 (“[I]t may be that web
scraping exceeding the scope of the website owner’s consent gives rise to a common law tort
claim for trespass to chattels, at least when it causes demonstrable harm.”).
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4. Role of Consumer Consent to Gather Scraped Data
If the (contractual) terms with the customer allow for the commercial
use of any such (anonymized) data – which may well be the case, given the
relatively little attention that customers have paid to issues of data privacy in
the past
98
– that data is often packaged and sold for either advertising
purposes or other analytical objectives which also includes investment funds
as possible buyers of such data. Regarding geolocation data, the origins of
such data will likely lie with either telecommunications companies (e.g.
Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile), with the proprietors of cellular operating
systems (e.g. Apple, Google
99
) or with any other company that gathers
constant data streams on smartphones through single apps.
(a) Foreseeability of Use for the Consumer?
Looking at the true meaning of consent in more detail, the issue arises
of whether the user merely needs to be notified of the possibility that his
location data may be used or whether he needs to be notified of what exactly
the gathering entity intends to do with it (e.g. sale of data to an investor).
Oftentimes the disclosure of intent by the data gathering entity is very
generic and may at no point indicate the actual intended commercial use
100
:
98. See CITI BUS. ADVISORY SERVS., supra note 59, at 17 (referring to a real-world
example in which “semi-private” data is being used for investment purposes: “App firms that
give away free services, such as email readers, are scrubbing their user base communications
for confirmation emails on purchased items and providing these receipts with SKU-level data
in bulk to investment managers on a monthly basis.”); Fortado, supra note 58 (quoting a
former prosecutor and current attorney at Dechert LLP: “You look in the small print and
there’s probably somewhere in there that says Verizon can sell that data.”).
99. See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, Google Is a Dragnet for the
Police, N.Y. TIMES (April 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/13/us/go
ogle-location-tracking-police.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Hom ep
age [https://perma.cc/EPT9-4YV9] (“Location data is a lucrative business — and Google is
by far the biggest player, propelled largely by its Android phones. It uses the data to power
advertising tailored to a person’s location, part of a more than $20 billion market for location-
based ads last year.”).
100. See Valentino-DeVries et. al., supra note 28 (citing Emmett Kilduff, CEO of Eagle
Alpha, a data broker for investment managers: “Most people don’t know what’s going on.”).
If the information is “material to consumers [acting reasonably under the circumstances] [ . . .
] [and] would likely affect the consumer’s conduct or decision with regard to a product or
service”, it constitutes a deceptive business practice to be curbed by the FTC. FED. TRADE
COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ONDECEPTIVELY FORMATTEDADVERTISEMENTS
1 (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/896923/15
1222deceptiveenforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL7D-W7WJ]. For more details on the
“reasonable consumer”-standard, see Celine Shirooni, Native Advertising in Social Media: Is
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Even the very liberal phrasing of the Terms of Use of The Weather Channel
App that only refer to “analyzing trends based on foot traffic” as their
example for “commercial purposes”
101
is not immediately suggestive of
helping investors generate returns by privately using one’s smartphone data.
(b) Possible Deception of the Consumer?
It would not be a stretch to state that activating the gathering of location
data for a weather app would seem like a necessity for a useful weather app
on a smartphone: How else will the app know which city’s weather to show
on the homescreen? If the user is expecting his consent for use of his data to
be necessary for the service in question to perform as advertised, it is all the
more unlikely that the customer will even take a closer look at the terms of
such a consent. Therefore, the commercial sale of such data to third parties
such as hedge funds for investment purposes that the customer himself
neither (reasonably) foresees nor in any way profits from may be somewhat
surprising.
102
As such, the collection and sale of data for investment purposes
that rely only on a blanket consent of the user may violate federal laws
103
against deceptive business practices.
104
Whether that can be equated with the
the FTC’s Reasonable Consumer Reasonable, 56WASH. U. J. L.&POL’Y 221, 234–39 (2018).
101. See THEWEATHERCHANNEL, PRIVACY POLICY 3(F) (December 5, 2018), https://wea
ther.com/en-US/twc/privacy-policy#us-how-we-share-new [https://perma.cc/U8PY-KF3Y]
(“As part of the Services, we may aggregate or otherwise alter information (including location
information) that is collected from the Services so that it does not identify your device and
cannot reasonably be linked to your device. We may use or share such information with third
parties for research or commercial purposes (e.g., analyzing trends based on foot traffic).”).
This clarification was added in response to an inquiry from The NewYork Times to the parent
company, IBM, in the course of an inquiry about business practices in commercial use of
smartphone data. Valentino-DeVries et. al., supra note 28.
102. But see Enrique Dans, They Wouldn’t Sell Your Geolocation Data Without Your
Permission . . ., FORBES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/enriquedans/ 2018/12
/11/they-wouldnt-sell-your-geolocation-data-without-your-permission/#400da2c77f08 [https
://perma.cc/Z56R-T7MT] (“The issue here is whether it is reasonable for an app to tuck away
a clause in its terms of service that allows it to sell its users’ sensitive geolocation data. The
answer is obvious: any app that does so should be fined heavily. Who would imagine that it
was okay to sell highly sensitive geolocation data? In other words, if companies are doing so,
it’s clearly without users’ knowledge.”).
103. More specifically, see Section 5 of the FTC Act (15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006)) which
prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”.
104. See Valentino-DeVries et. al., supra note 28 (citing Maneesha Mithal of the FTC:
“You can’t cure a misleading just-in-time disclosure with information in a privacy policy.”).
The FTC recently reached a settlement with PayPal over allegations that the company was
misleading Venmo customers “about the extent to which they could control the privacy of
their transactions.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAYPAL SETTLES FTC CHARGES THAT VENMO
FAILED TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION TO CONSUMERS ABOUT THE ABILITY TO TRANSFER FUNDS
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deception required for a breach of duty under insider trading law is
unclear
105
: While a deceptive business practice innately contains an element
of deceit – and, as such, arguably contains fraudulent behavior by definition
–, it is likely not exactly of the same nature as the concretely fraudulent act
that is required for insider trading under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5. A
misleading business practice may be contravening trade and consumer
protection regulation but does not necessarily rise to the level of affirmative
misrepresentation that is required when access to digital information is
concerned.
106
(c) Impact on Consumer Consent
Unless there is fraud with respect to the relevant part of the terms that
allow for a gathering of data that is later used as part of the investment
research, that customer consent will likely be enough for hedge funds trading
on the gathered data to avoid insider trading liability as there is not even a
contractual breach.
SEC v. Dot9: The location data that DataPortal used as the
basis for its analysis could be gathered and sold in
accordance with the terms of use of LocalCookBook. As
there is no clear indication of fraud – in particular, there
is likely no reliance
107
of the customer on the fact that the
data he is explicitly allowing the app proprietor to gather
would not be used for commercial purposes such as
investment research (especially considering the ubiquity
of user preferences-based advertising that obviously rests
on the commercial use of customer data) – that consent is
AND PRIVACY SETTINGS; VIOLATED GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT (Feb. 27, 2018), https://ww
w.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/02/paypal-settles-ftc-charges-venmo-failed-disc
lose-information [https://perma.cc/F9PF-2TKN].
105. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 4 (“Since many phone and credit-card companies
include clauses in their contracts allowing them to sell information, that condition [i.e. “breach
of duty”] is rarely fulfilled.”).
106. See United States v. Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Broad as the
concept of “deception” may be, it irreducibly entails some act that gives the victim a false
impression.”); S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[M]isrepresenting one’s
identity in order to gain access to information that is otherwise off limits, and then stealing
that information is plainly ‘deceptive’ within the ordinary meaning of the word.”).
107. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) (“[R]eliance is and long has
been an element of common-law fraud, see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 (1977);
W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 108 (5th
ed. 1984).”).
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likely to be considered valid and encompasses the sale of
data to DataPortal. As there was no breach of fiduciary
duty through the sale of the customer data from
LocalCookBook to DataPortal, there can be no derivative
breach in DataPortal’s subsequent sale of that data to
Dot9, equally ruling out an insider trading violation by
Dot9.
When it all comes down to it, oftentimes the sale of user data to
analytics firms or directly to hedge funds will be contractually allowed, no
matter how obscure the clause may be
108
– and therefore not pose a scenario
in which a breach of fiduciary duty is likely to occur.
109
D. Personal Benefit to the Tipper / Tippee Liability / Scienter
It has been the subject of much discussion whether and to what extent
a personal benefit must accrue to the insider when he relays the information
to a third party in breach of his fiduciary duties. The current state of play is
that there must a personal benefit conferred upon the insider.
110
This
personal benefit does not, however, have to be pecuniary but can also lie in
the immaterial pleasure taken in wanting to benefit a relative or a friend with
a one-sided gift.
111
Some uncertainty remains whether gifting a stranger a
108. See Theodore Rostow, What Happens When an Acquaintance Buys Your Data?: A
New Privacy Harm in the Age of Data Brokers, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 667, 706 (2017) (urging
the FTC to require “logistically smooth opt-in provisions regarding the sale of collected data”,
implicitly acknowledging the reality that current practices, although questionable from a
consumer perspective, are in line with current consent requirements).
109. Moral outrage does not negate contractual consent as long as neither fraud nor duress
is present (only the former could possibly be relevant, but fraud seems like a severe stretch as
long as one does not demand an explicit and itemized warning by the proprietor that any
gathered data may be sold for investment research purposes). See THE ECONOMIST, supra
note 4 (“[The] condition [breach of fiduciary duty] is rarely fulfilled”). For a different
(emotionally charged) perspective see Dans, supra note 102. “Contrary to common belief,
just because something is included in a contract and we sign it doesn’t make it legal.” Id.
110. See Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (“[T]he test is whether the insider
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure”). See also Karmel, supra
note 85, at 125 (being critical, both with an eye towards the judicial doctrine as well as towards
the SEC’s application of said doctrine: “Surely, it would have been better to develop a doctrine
to distinguish between diligent research and information obtained through dishonest methods.
On the other hand, the SEC should have developed such a doctrine rather than trying to cast
the widest possible net to catch insider traders.”).
111. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016) (overruling United States v.
Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014)) (“To the extent the Second Circuit held that the
tipper must also receive something of a “pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” in exchange
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piece of inside information also satisfies the requirement as the holding of
the leading case on this area was somewhat narrow,
112
but in the context of
alternative data accumulation by investment managers this is unlikely to be
relevant as the data is all but certain to be paid for.
SEC v. Dot9 In the case at hand, the prerequisite of DataPortal
receiving a personal benefit for any disclosure is
undoubtedly met through the monetary compensation
DataPortal received from Dot9.
113
In general, insider trading liability depends on an element of scienter of
the trader regarding the breach of fiduciary duty. As a subjective element,
scienter is understood to be “a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.”
114
If – as in the example case of SEC v. Dot9 – the
for a gift to family or friends, Newman, 773 F.3d, at 452, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that
this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.”); United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1094
(9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (“Proof that the insider disclosed material
nonpublic information with the intent to benefit a trading relative or friend is sufficient to
establish the breach of fiduciary duty element of insider trading.”); see also Peter J. Henning,
Making Up Insider Trading Law as You Go, 56 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 101, 118 (2018)
(“[Salman] turns out to be an uninteresting case that adds little to the law of insider trading.”).
112. The U.S. Supreme Court likely did not want to equate the wilful act of information
disclosure with automatically receiving a personal benefit (this would arguably have been
sensible as voluntarily giving up something of value confers upon the grantor the benefit of
allocating his resources according to his preferences which are paramount from an economical
viewpoint). Matthew J. Wilkins, You Don’t Need Love . . . But It Helps: Insider Trading Law
after Salman, 106 KY. L.J. 433, 448 (2017). Otherwise its emphasis on potential difficulties
for the courts with finding a personal (non-monetary) benefit in cases without relatives or
friends going forward would be somewhat perplexing. See Salman v. United States, 137 S.
Ct. 420, 429 (partially quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)) (“It remains the case
that ‘[d]etermining whether an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a
question of fact, will not always be easy for courts.’ 463 U.S., at 664, 103 S.Ct. 3255. But
there is no need for us to address those difficult cases today, because this case involves
‘precisely the “gift of confidential information to a trading relative” thatDirks envisioned.’”).
A newer case out of the Second Circuit, which previously narrowed the definition of “personal
benefit” in Newman, argues now – in partial contradiction to Newman – that “sheer
speculation into the tipper’s motives” may actually give rise to a personal benefit even outside
of relatives and friends as recipients when “circumstantial evidence” support the claim that
the tipper wanted to benefit the tippee. United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64, 76 (2d Cir.
2017) (“[T]he personal benefit element can be met by evidence that the tipper’s disclosure of
inside information was intended to benefit the tippee.”).
113. Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983) (finding that deciding whether there has
been a breach of duty by the insider “requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether
the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a
pecuniary gain”).
114. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12, 212–14 (1976) (“[H]istory
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trader is relying on information furnished to him from a tipper, the disclosure
from tipper to tippee itself must be a violation of a fiduciary duty as “absent
a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach [of the tippee].”
115
A key element of tippee liability then is whether he knows or has reason
to know that the disclosure of information to him constitutes a breach of
fiduciary duty, thereby participating in the original breach through the use of
the fiduciaries’ information in securities trades.
116
Generally, the knowledge
requirement is regarded as a meaningful barrier to the insider trading liability
of hedge funds relying on information gathered, arranged and provided to
them by third parties.
117
This holds true especially when the data provider
stipulates to having obtained any and all furnished data lawfully and without
improprieties, providing the hedge fund with a potential safe harbor excuse
for allegations of insider trading.
118
Neither such warranties nor the
knowledge requirement per se can, however, insulate hedge funds entirely
from possible misconduct.
SEC v. Dot9: The manager at Dot9 had knowledge of where
the internal Apple customer data came from. He needn’t
have known the specifics of the contract between
DataPortal and Apple to know (or reasonably infer) that
disclosing such data to a third person – even integrated as
part of an aggregation – would constitute a violation of
DataPortal’s fiduciary duties to its client. The fact that
the data set contained Apple store customer analytics that
could not possibly have originated from a public source
mak[es] clear that when the Commission adopted the Rule [i.e. Rule 10b-5] it was intended
to apply only to activities that involved scienter.”); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Tipper/Tippee Insider Trading as Unlawful Deceptive Conduct: Insider Gifts of Material
Nonpublic Information to Strangers, 56 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 65, 91 (2018) (“No opinion
of the U.S. Supreme Court has fully or formally established the nature of the required state of
mind for insider trading liability . . . .”).
115. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983); see also SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 287
(2d Cir. 2012) (“A tippee must have some level of knowledge that by trading on the
information the tippee is a participant in the tipper’s breach of fiduciary duty.”).
116. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 n.19 (quoting Inv’rs Mgmt. Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633 (July
29, 1971)) (“[O]ne element of tippee liability is that the tippee knew or had reason to know
that the information ‘was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation
or otherwise.’”).
117. For hedge funds’ possible insider trading liability when relying on acquired political
intelligence, see Pauley, supra note 2, at 645. “[F]inding knowledge is a high hurdle.” Id.
118. See Pauley, supra note 2, at 646 (explaining that PI firms’ statements that they have
disavowed insider tactics provides hedge funds with a safe harbour to argue that they did not
know that information was obtained illegally).
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(who else could gather concrete data on which portion of
registered Apple store customers complete a purchase
other than Apple itself or an agent thereof?) should have
raised an immediate red flag with a sophisticated
investor.
119
The assurance by DataPortal that all
information provided had been obtained legally, is of no
effect in the face of actual knowledge of a fiduciary
breach.
120
By at least consciously disregarding the flaring
warning signal, the PM at Dot9 acted therefore with
scienter and is likely liable for an insider trading violation.
E. Interim Finding
Even if cases in the digital world do exist in which insider trading
liability comes into play
121
– especially when hacking is involved or
proprietary data is transmitted in violation of contractual and fiduciary duties
–, scraped data generally does not give rise to criminal or civil liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
SEC v. Dot9: Only the information regarding the
buying/grievance-airing customer split that DataPortal
misappropriated through breaching its fiduciary duty to
its client, Apple, will likely have given rise to an insider
119. See SEC. v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 288 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[This is a] fact-specific inquiry
turning on the tippee’s own knowledge and sophistication and on whether the tipper’s conduct
raised red flags that confidential information was being transmitted improperly.”).
120. See United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 61–62 (2017) (declaring the consultant’s
assurance “not to disclose any confidential information in a consultation” to be without effect
on the defendant’s guilt).
121. In rare cases, the breach of some sort of fiduciary duty may seem obvious. See THE
ECONOMIST, supra note 4 (describing a case in which an ex-employee of the U.S. federal
government reportedly offered “predictions” of reports his former agency was working on for
sale to a hedge fund; if such “predictions” are to carry any value, some fiduciary duty breach
stemming from the relationship agency-(ex-)employee seems more than likely). Similarly,
the SEC opened an administrative proceedings against Deerfield, an investment adviser in the
health care sector, and subsequently settled for a penalty of around $4 million, under the
following circumstances. See Deerfield Management Company, L.P., SEC Docket (CCH)
3608571 (2017) (“In May and June 2012, the political intelligence analyst provided Deerfield
analysts with specific information regarding confidential CMS deliberations regarding cuts to
Medicare reimbursement rates for certain radiation oncology treatments. The Deerfield
analysts recommended trades based on this information, and Deerfield then traded on behalf
of certain of its hedge funds to sell short shares of two companies who offered products and
services related to radiation oncology. The hedge funds that Deerfield advised then profited
when CMS announced the rate cuts.”).
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trading liability of Dot9’s PM.
122
While that should put hedge funds on guard against analytics companies
pitching them scraped datasets that noticeably implicate proprietary
information or information that can’t possibly be public and should also
motivate them to implement a judicious screening process
123
before data sets
are purchased or internal investment research utilizing such data sets is part
of the mix of information underpinning a trade,
124
the scienter requirement
and the prerequisite that there must be a breach of fiduciary responsibility
(or a fraudulent equivalent thereof) in the acquisition and/or the disclosure
of the information at hand act as sensible restrictions on insider trading
doctrine in the digital world.
122. See BLUERIVERPARTNERS, supra note 92, at 10 (“[I]f the adviser’s receipt of scraped
data results in a violation of confidentiality obligations, and the adviser uses that data for
securities transactions, it may risk the adviser violating anti-fraud provisions pursuant to the
misappropriation theory.”).
123. See Altman et. al., supra note 13, at 4 (“[D]iligence includes determining who owns
the data the firm is purchasing, and verifying that its vendors have the right to sell that data to
the firm for the firm’s intended use.”); CITI BUS. ADVISORY SERVS., supra note 59, at 17
(adding the following caveat to the utility of alternative data for investment strategies: “where
there is no prohibition against mining obtainable data”); Sam Dale, Alternative Data: What
are the Regulatory Risks?, HFMWEEK 16, 17 (Nov. 9–15, 2017) (referring to the common
practice of a general counsel at a $2 billion hedge fund: “insert[ing] a covenant in our
agreement to say they [i.e. the alternative data provider] won’t provide us with MNPI or any
information in breach of a duty to any third party”); Horton, supra note 11, at 7 (“[Techniques
include] adopting a policy regarding insider trading; recordkeeping; implementing employee
training programs; monitoring employees’ personal securities trading; maintaining
information barriers; and enforcing issues internally”); Pauley, supra note 2, at 646 (“[I]t
would be wise for hedge funds . . . to limit their communications . . . to only the final
product, which ideally would contain both a disclaimer and a statement of sources and
methods.”); Butterworth, supra note 68 (“Investors using web scraping techniques should
therefore carefully consider any processes used and assess whether they involve elements of
deceit and identity masking.”); TomHardin, The Inside Scoop on Insider Trading Prevention:
Best Practices for Hedge Funds, NICEACTIMIZE (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.niceactimize.co
m/blog/The-Inside-Scoop-on-Insider-Trading-Prevention-Best-Practices-for-Hedge-Funds-5
57 [https://perma.cc/GG52-LLPG] (“[C]ompliance is frequently under pressure from analysts
to permit a data source on the basis that other firms are using that source.”).
124. Actual reliance onmaterial, non-public information for a specific trade is not required
for insider trading liability. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 159–60 (2d Cir.
2013) (holding that possession of such information while executing a trade is sufficient).
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IV. NORMATIVEANALYSIS – ARE THERE LEGITIMATEREASONS
TO SUBJUGATE TRADESBASED ON SCRAPEDDATA TO INSIDER
TRADINGDOCTRINE?
As recent years have shown, insider trading law is a malleable
instrument that can be employed in varying sets of circumstances to
disincentivize harmful behavior.
125
The history of insider trading law itself
shows that its broad and potentially all-encompassing wording was intended
to provide flexibility for the law to evolve in the face of “cunning devices.”
126
Throughout the twenty-first century, nothing has proven more cunning than
the technological capacities of the ever-evolving IT world. The relatively
new phenomenon of data scraping then seems primed to be – undeservedly,
perhaps – understood as a threatening new technology that deepens or even
creates information asymmetries incompatible with the concept of a free
market. While technological progress is usually outwardly applauded, those
same newly created possibilities can quickly become the reason for crying
foul in the face of unruly capital markets gains, potential unfairness being
one of the driving forces behind advancements in insider trading
regulation
127
.
125. See Henning, supra note 111, at 120 (“[Insider trading is] an area of the law that is
the product of judicial creation, with a little help from the SEC in its rulemaking”); Reed
Harasimowicz, Nothing New, Man!-The Second Circuit’s Clarification of Insider Trading
Liability inUnited States v. Newman Comes at A Critical Juncture in the Evolution of Insider
Trading, 57 B.C. L. REV. 765, 800 (2016) (“The law of insider trading remains largely
convoluted, especially with attempts by the SEC to expand the boundaries of the law with
novel prosecution strategies against remote tippees.”); Yesha Yadav, Insider Information and
the Limits of Insider Trading, 56 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 135, 141 (2018) (explaining that
“[c]ourts have shown themselves willing to stretch legal interpretation to find that a breach of
a fiduciary duty has taken place in order to impose sanctions on bad actors,” giving the
liability for hackers in Dorozhko as a prime example of this functional application of insider
trading doctrine).
126. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 884 (2d Cir. 1968)
(quoting Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the H.
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 [1934] [statement of Thomas
Corcoran, Counsel with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation]); see also Zachary J.
Gubler, “Maximalism with an Experimental Twist”: Insider Trading Law at the Supreme
Court, 56WASH.U. J. L.&POL’Y 49, 55 (2018) (“Congress seems to have implicitly delegated
lawmaking authority on insider trading law to the Court . . . .”).
127. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Legitimate yet Manipulative: The Conundrum of Open-
Market Manipulation, 68 DUKE L. J. 479, 531 (2018) (“[T]he grounds for punishing insider
trading . . . are often phrased in terms of fairness . . . .”); Robert A. Prentice, The Internet
and Its Challenges for the Future of Insider Trading Regulation, 12 HARV. J. L. &TECH. 263,
305 (1999) (rightfully equating the perceived unfairness of an activity with the resulting thrust
behind any regulatory activity); see also James Walsh, “Look Then to Be Well Edified, When
the Fool Delivers the Madman”: Insider-Trading Regulation After Salman v United States,
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In line with that suspicion, while perusing the broad and multi-faceted
range of literature on this particular topic, one can quickly get the impression
that insider trading doctrine might either already be applicable to scraped
data or commentators are assuming that it might be in the future.
128
Even if
the current case law does not seem to put trading on scraped data within the
ambit of insider trading doctrine, one might therefore wonder whether this,
asking from a purely normative standpoint, might be the case in the future.
129
This thought experiment, which is supposed to shed light on the motivation
behind imposing insider trading restrictions on scraped data as well as
67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 979, 996 (2017) (“[A]s a public policy matter, the time has come
for the federal government to take a hardline stance on insider trading, because there’s no
telling howmany more Newman’s are waiting in the wings of appellate courts, and howmany
insiders are out there seeking “recognition” and industry status as players with reliable
information.”).
128. SeeBLUERIVERPARTNERS, supra note 92, at 10 (“Advisers engaging in web scraping
must be aware of regulatory risks stemming from MNPI and insider trading concerns.”); CITI
BUS. ADVISORY SERVS., supra note 59, at 17 (“[I]nvestment managers will have to walk a fine
line and make sure that that they are complying with insider trading regulations . . . .”); Dale,
supra note 123, at 16 (quoting Doug Dannemiller, investment research leader for the Deloitte
Center for Financial Services) (“There is a lot of undefined space with alterative data, but
venturing into material non-public information (MNPI) is a main concern . . . .”); DELOITTE
CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS., supra note 3, at 6–7, 15 (“Material nonpublic information (MNPI) risk:
. . . [I]f an alternative data set is thought to be too predictive of normally protected information
such as quarterly revenue, then some firms are steering clear of the data . . . . There are still
open questions about acceptable practices in the areas of web-gathered information . . . .
[T]here are certainly risks associated with incorporating alternative data into investment-
decision processes . . . .”); INTEGRITY RESEARCH ASSOCS., supra note 38, at 8 (rating the
insider trading risk for the alternative data sources of credit card transactions, email receipts,
geolocation and satellites – all of which can “possibl[y]” be acquired on an exclusive basis –
as “[h]igher”); Crane, Crotty & Umar, supra note 3, at 3 n.3 (“Note that private information
is not necessarily illegal insider information but could instead stem from hard-to-get or costly
data sources (e.g., satellite data, mobile phone data) . . . .”); THE ECONOMIST, supra note 4
(“[T]he need to sort useful from pointless, and legal from dubious, has never been greater.”);
Wieczner, supra note 3 (“Web scraping and other alternative data collection practices are
already fueling debate over what constitutes nonpublic information and insider trading—and
whether investors can misuse information even when it’s public and legally obtained.”);
Butterworth, supra note 68 (“[R]isk of liability under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
SEC Rule 10b-5 is particularly sharp regarding the use of web-scraped data.”); Daruwell,
supra note 93 (“One of the larger risks associated with the use of data extracted from the web
for investment decision making is the risk of obtaining insider information . . . .”); Hardin,
supra note 123 (“Today, there are a lot of potential issues with respect to data sets and data
scraping, where firms are coming into possession of semi-private data in the research
process.”).
129. See Dale, supra note 123, at 17 (“Hedge fund compliance professionals and lawyers
say alternative data is not currently a top priority for the SEC, but that could change. [ . . . ]
Regulations are not evolving as quickly as the technology but this could change very soon”).
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indicate the likelihood of such a development
130
— there being potentially
huge implications for the research operations of investment managers — is
guided by privacy concerns, the possible impact on competition, potential
skewing of market incentives and, perhaps most importantly, the
compatibility of such an application with the underlying doctrine of insider
trading law.
A. Privacy and Data Protection Concerns
On the one hand, encouraging investors to gather and dissect data by all
means necessary to stay ahead of the curve arguably creates skewed
incentives: When data scraping involves, for example, violating individual’s
privacy rights, the incentive-structure of allowing this practice to go forward
(generated returns not subject to disgorgement) may result in a negative,
external effect.
131
While the benefits of trading on the scraped data are
captured only by the employees and shareholders of the respective investor,
the fall-out regarding the further erosion of privacy (e.g. economically
relevant, increased reluctance of people to share data or partake in an
offering by a company; loss of the public trust in corporate data protection
promises that may lead to underinvestment and subsequent, avoidable
insolvencies) has to be shouldered by society writ large. In addition, terms
of use regarding web-based scraping — even if their content may be
questionable from an economical standpoint — would be rendered partially
ineffective by allowing illegally scraped data sets to be retailed without fear
of insider trading doctrine kicking in, potentially lowering trust in
contractual freedom and the legal system as a whole. All that could be
avoided by integrating (perceived) privacy concerns into insider trading
doctrine in a way that removes the incentive for data harvesting in an area
(e.g. location data, medical records) where privacy violations are likely to
arise.
132
130. See also Ronald J. Colombo, Buy, Sell, or Hold? Analyst Fraud from Economic and
Natural Law Perspectives, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 118 (2007) (“But this begs an interesting
question: is Rule 10b-5’s apparent inability truly a shortcoming? Perhaps the failure of the
traditional elements of Rule 10b-5 to cover the phenomenon of analyst fraud suggests that
such fraud ought not be subject to sanction. [ . . . ] For these and similar questions, a normative
lens is needed through which securities law and policy can be analyzed.”).
131. This is a term stemming from microeconomics. See DAVID H. HYMAN, PUBLIC
FINANCE 99 (9th ed. 2008) (“When a negative externality exists, the price of a good or service
does not reflect the full marginal cost of resources allocated to its production”).
132. This would prevent data brokers from shunning responsibility for previously
committed privacy violations. See Valentino-DeVries et. al., supra note 28 (“‘Most people
don’t know what’s going on,’ said Emmett Kilduff, the chief executive of Eagle Alpha, which
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On the other hand, while some of the privacy, data protection and
competition concerns that engulf the widespread practice of data scraping
may seem legitimate,
133
insider trading law seems like the wrong instrument
to combat those.
134
Privacy law and its enforcement should be vigorously
strengthened to address any problems identified in those areas.
135
Outlawing
investment strategies that are based on scraping only removes one of a host
of incentives to commit the perceived privacy violations. Data protection
sells data to financial firms and hedge funds. Mr. Kilduff said responsibility for complying
with data-gathering regulations fell to the companies that collected it from people.”).
133. But see Rostow, supra note 108, at 678 (“As a general rule, statutes do not prevent
brokers from buying and selling an enormous amount of information, digitally produced by
consumers, relating to their health and physiology, cognitive abilities, interests, purchases,
wealth, compulsions and social networks.”). For general commenting on possible privacy
erosions through the rise of data hegemons, see Maurice E. Stucke, Should We Be Concerned
About Data-Opolies?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 275, 290 (2018). “Network effects and other
entry barriers protect data-opolies from many forms of competition. As a result, they can
depress an important parameter of non-price competition, privacy protection, below
competitive levels and collect personal data above competitive levels.” Id.
134. See Bertrand Guerin & AnnaWolf-Posch, Special Report of the German Monopolies
Commission: Can Competition Law Address Challenges Raised by Digital Markets?, 7 J.
EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 30, 36 (2016) (“The Special Report recognises that the
practices of search engines that are capable of raising competition concerns [i.e. scraping] can
fully be addressed under existing competition law.”); Stucke, supra note 133, at 323 (offering
a solution to combating the dangers data-opolies pose to privacy expectations and a free
market equilibrium: “[a]ntitrust enforcers must coordinate with privacy and consumer
protection officials”). For a (very opinionated) motivation to regulate scraping that views
scraping suspect, but is unlikely to be stemmed by the application of insider trading doctrine,
see Robert Ridless, This LinkedIn Lawsuit Proves The Left Doesn’t Really Care About
Securing Your Data, THE FEDERALIST (Apr. 10, 2018), https://thefederalist.com/2018/04/10/
linkedin-lawsuit-proves-left-doesnt-really-care-securing-data/ [https://perma.cc/P8EX-HL7
R]. “As a society we are legitimately wondering whether informed user consent can really
protect us. But what is more worrisome is that here, if LinkedIn loses, user consent will have
ceased altogether to be a benchmark of best practices. This is far from reassuring. Even with
more privacy regulation on the horizon, there is no guaranteeing the “intelligence” gathered
on us is information we’d ever knowingly entrust to the often partisan actors who
paternalistically claim the right to control it.” Id.
135. See, e.g., David Dayen, Big Tech: The New Predatory Capitalism, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT (Dec. 26, 2017), https://prospect.org/health/big-tech-new-predatory-capitalism/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/7WJP-A7KG] (“[L]egitimate fear that GDPR will threaten the data-profiling
gravy train.”); Sallie Ann Keller, Stephanie Shipp &Aaron Schroeder,Does Big Data Change
the Privacy Landscape? A Review of the Issues, 3 ANNU. REV. STAT. APPL. 161, 162 (2016)
(“The all data revolution is changing the focus of the privacy discussion from the masking
and suppression of data in order to maintain confidentiality, to trust, policy, and
governance.”); Matsakis, supra note 28 (“Tech companies are also beginning to acknowledge
that personal data collection needs to be regulated.”); Rostow, supra note 108, at 706 (“[T]he
FTC should explore requiring companies to include a narrow set of clear, logistically smooth
opt-in [NB: as opposed to the currently widespread opt-out practice] provisions regarding the
sale of collected data.”).
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laws—lying at the root of any perceived problems—should be the tool that
advances individual citizens’ interests in this regard.
136
A convincing
argument can be made that insider trading law — which is based on the
notion that trading gains should not stem from a fraudulently obtained edge
in key information unknown to the market at large – is ill-fitting for this
purpose: The goal of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is to prevent fraudulent
trading,
137
i.e. trading where the information that is being depended upon is
sourced through deceiving someone in violation of a fiduciary duty and
subsequent reliance on that information on the trading market therefore
reinforces that fraud as the trader in question is one step ahead of his fellow
market participants in a direction in which other investors, even with smart
and resourceful behavior, cannot possibly follow.
138
No matter the policy
concerns with data scraping, that description, as it stands, simply does not fit
the bill with regard to trading on alternative data sets. Moreover, by trying
to patch up privacy law deficits with the hammer of insider trading liability,
data protection laws will remain woefully inadequate in all other situations,
i.e. where the dubiously acquired information is, for example, used for
marketing purposes or as social leverage.
139
Calling for insider trading
liability on scraped data sets may, with regard to consumer protection, hence
lead to a pyrrhic victory.
B. Impact on Competition
If trading on scraped data is illegal, investors will have no incentive to
purchase any data sets from data vendors. Data vendors that rely on
innovative algorithms to scrape public information and other companies’
websites (an emerging business model for newly conceived ventures)
economically subsist on the interest of professional investors in their
packaged product. Their entire business model depends on the ability of
136. See Matsakis, supra note 28 (“Even in a divided Congress, lawmakers could come
together around privacy—scrutinizing Big Tech has become an important issue for both
sides. . . . Until consumers actually understand the ecosystem they’ve unwittingly become a
part of, we won’t be able to grapple with it in the first place.”).
137. See, for the Rule’s substantive origin, Milton V. Freeman, Administrative
Procedures, 22 BUS. LAW. 891, 922 (1967). “All the Commissioners read the rule and they
tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who
said, “Well” he said, “we are against fraud, aren’t we?” That is how it happened.” Id.
138. For the SEC’s view on this in Matter of Merrill Lynch, see Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 (Nov. 25, 1968). “[I]nherent unfairness involved where one takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to the investing public.” Id.
139. But seeRostow, supra note 108, at 673 (pointing to the danger of “relational control”,
when individuals are able to obtain telling information on one another via data brokers).
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investors to use that information legally. All that will remain as a source for
data that may lend itself to structuring a trading strategy around are digital
behemoths that already have a significant portion of data under their
(proprietary) control, giving them even an incentive to take over the business
model of the data vendors.
140
In practically outlawing the use of scraped data
for trading purposes one may unwillingly cement the market leader position
of already uber-competitive data giants.
141
New ventures relying on novel
data accumulation schemas that may challenge the hegemony of modern-day
oil giants
142
will thusly be made more difficult to sustain.
143
That may be
especially disheartening given the sheer ubiquity of ever-available data as
the valuable skill nowadays should lie in developing a smart schema to
gather and analyze information rather than in being able to successfully
block off innovative search algorithms.
144
Those consequences seem
140. See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 17-16783, 2019 WL 4251889, at 15 (9th
Cir. Sept. 9, 2019) (“[G]iving companies like LinkedIn free rein to decide, on any basis, who
can collect and use data—data that the companies do not own, that they otherwise make
publicly available to viewers, and that the companies themselves collect and use—risks the
possible creation of information monopolies that would disserve the public interest.”); hiQ
Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 (quoting from the hiQ brief:
“LinkedIn is unfairly leveraging its power in the professional networking market to secure an
anticompetitive advantage in another market—the data analytics market.”); Eran Halevy,
Once Only for Huge Companies, ‘Web Scraping’ Is Now an Online Arms Race No Internet
Marketer Can Avoid, ENTREPRENEUR (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/
311261 [https://perma.cc/UA24-U97X] (“What started as a one-way tool to extract web data
and increase competition for the benefit of consumers turned into an arms race in which the
target websites try to sabotage the data collection in order to achieve a competitive
advantage.”).
141. See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1119 (“[W]ould delegate
to private parties the sole authority to decide who gets to participate in the marketplace of
ideas located in the “modern public square” of the Internet.”). See also OECD, BIG DATA:
BRINGING COMPETITION POLICY TO THEDIGITAL ERA 4 (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.oecd.org
/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/M%282016%292/ANN4/
FINAL&docLanguage=En [https://perma.cc/J956-F6SY] (“A first approach to incorporate
Big Data into competition law enforcement is to treat data as an input or asset that companies
may use to enhance their market power and engage in exclusionary practices.”)
142. See Matsakis, supra note 28 (“Personal data is often compared to oil—it powers
today’s most profitable corporations, just like fossil fuels energized those of the past.”).
143. See Greene, supra note 83 (drawing a comparison to the hiQ/LinkedIn case:
“Basically LinkedIn believes it has a right to deny 3rd parties, like HiQ, from scraping data
which was intentionally set by users to be made publicly available.”).
144. See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1119 (“In view of the
vast amount of information publicly available, the value and utility of much of that
information is derived from the ability to find, aggregate, organize, and analyze data.”). See
also Halevy, supra note 140 (“More cunning is serving falsified information -- serving bots a
higher-than-actual price, for example -- to foil the scraper’s plan, rather than the
mechanism.”); Hirschey, supra note 26, at 926 (“[D]ata hosts that accept the valuable role of
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unwelcome from an anti-trust perspective.
145
Furthermore, they might also
forebode a future in which the free flow of information is negatively
impacted:
146
Essentially, one might say in hyperbole, the free market, as
reformed by the invention of the internet and the rise of data as the new gold,
itself is at stake when the operators of websites that publicize information
are able to stave off any professional analyzing of their data on display as it
forestalls the dissemination and commercial use of material that should
belong to the public sphere.
147
Making access to data more costly
148
or
scrapers in the digital environment stand to benefit from cooperative scraping.”); Hughes,
supra note 83 (“[P]rofound insights that could enhance social welfare lie at the intersections
of these databases.”). The self-reinforcing nature of such market dominance is indicative of
so-called “network effects”. Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90N.C.
L. REV. 1771, 1787–88 (2012).
145. But see hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1118 (“hiQ has
presented some evidence supporting its assertion that LinkedIn’s decision to revoke hiQ’s
access to its data was made for the purpose of eliminating hiQ as a competitor in the data
analytics field, and thus potentially “violates the policy or spirit” of the ShermanAct.”); David
Bailey, The New Frontiers of Article 102 TFEU: Antitrust Imperialism or Judicious
Intervention?, 6 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 25, 51 (2018) (““[C]lose link” that may well
exist between some (often online) markets on which a firm is dominant, on the one hand, and
the gathering of huge amounts of data that is used to reinforce or strengthen the firm’s position
in the dominated market.”).
146. See D. Victoria Baranetsky, Data Journalism and the Law, TOW CENTER FOR
DIGITAL JOURNALISM (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/data-journali
sm-and-the-law.php [https://perma.cc/6NCS-ZLSJ] (“As data collection becomes
increasingly important for investigative journalists in particular, legal experts worry about
civil and criminal penalties that exist under the statute [i.e. CFAA]—which has been described
by some First Amendment advocates as unconstitutionally vague.”).
147. See Stucke, supra note 133, at 321–22 (The data-opoly can dictate who is granted
access to the data and for what purpose, and thereby influence the nature of innovation.”);
Yadav, supra note 125, at 150 (“Investors who must spend money on information
infrastructure . . . are likely to be less motivated to spend additional funds on researching
information.”). In the LinkedIn case, the courts were voicing similar concerns. See hiQ Labs,
Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 17-16783, 2019 WL 4251889, at 9 (“If companies like LinkedIn,
whose servers hold vast amounts of public data, are permitted selectively to ban only potential
competitors from accessing and using that otherwise public data, the result—complete
exclusion of the original innovator in aggregating and analyzing the public information—may
well be considered unfair competition under California law.”); hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn
Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1119 (“For present purposes, the Court concludes that the public
interest favors hiQ’s position. As explained above, the actual privacy interests of LinkedIn
users in their public data are at best uncertain. It is likely that those who opt for the public
view setting expect their public profile will be subject to searches, date mining, aggregation,
and analysis. On the other hand, conferring on private entities such as LinkedIn, the blanket
authority to block viewers from accessing information publicly available on its website for
any reason, backed by sanctions of the CFAA, could pose an ominous threat to public
discourse and the free flow of information promised by the Internet.”).
148. See David Easley, Maureen O’Hara & Liyan Yang, Differential Access to Price
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restricting its dissemination in other ways has generally been a precursor for
threatening a market equilibrium in which all interested investors have equal
incentive to enter the market.
149
Giving, for example, hedge funds – which
need not be established players, but may also just consist of a couple of
talented and ambitious economists – and their data suppliers the leeway to
harvest publicly available data for their endeavors in a way democratizes the
digital world.
If the concern is that single data sets – in conjunction with exclusive
purchase agreements – become so dominant that whoever purchases them
has an unassailable investing edge over every other market participants,
antitrust issues might possibly arise and competition lawmay need to address
those concerns if and when they become prevalent. Nonetheless, this does
not, in and of itself, make trading on that data fraudulent behavior, it merely
raises free market concerns that are not best undertaken by insider trading
doctrine.
C. Market Incentives
On the one hand, the use of scraped data by hedge funds seems like an
inventive way to make money in the age of seemingly endless amounts of
data that ordinary people have difficulty making sense of. Since the data is
out there, smart analysts at hedge funds should arguably be able to connect
the dots and reap the benefits of their ingenuity.
150
On its face, it seems
Information in Financial Markets 51 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 1071, 1073 (2016) (“If the
profit-maximizing price of market data is high, then in equilibrium only some traders purchase
price data, and therefore our model exhibits differential access to price information. We show
that differential access generally increases the cost of capital and volatility, reduces market
efficiency and liquidity, discourages the production of fundamental information, harms
liquidity traders, and benefits rational traders relative to an economy in which all traders
observe price data simultaneously.”).
149. See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1285 (2017)
(“Barriers to entry arise from the difficulty in obtaining key data. [ . . . ] Part of the problem
is that bots often cannot legally obtain the information they would like to aggregate and
analyze, even if that information seems freely available on the web. For online data, sellers
have used the law to prevent web scraping, by which intermediaries use web crawlers or
spiders to gather online information.”). Some even argue that innovation and competition
will be helped by regulators stepping in to dilute the IP rights of tech giants. But see Dayen,
supra note 135 (“If Google were put into a compulsory licensing regime, it would have to
give up patents for its search algorithms, self-driving cars, mapping software, virtual reality,
and Android operating system, to name a few. As the Bell Labs example shows, this type of
antitrust enforcement enhances public welfare by benefiting both competition and
innovation.”).
150. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 659 n.17 (1983) (quote from the SEC briefs:
“analysts remain free to obtain from management corporate information for purposes of
2020] ALTERNATIVEDATAACCUMULATION 671
entirely counterintuitive to a free market to bar trading on astute analytical
findings and thereby put a severe damper on incentives to utilize modern
technology in seeking a competitive edge in trading.
151
Whereas investment
research used to involve on-the-ground fact-finding and physical
investigations in the not-too-distant past, the same – or even better –
assessment on a companies’ prospects can now be made with the help of
digital tools alone.
152
So long as the scraping process does not involve
forcibly breaching closed networks or the technologically deceptive
circumvention of other technological barriers – since there is a good
argument to be made that hacking, as in Dorozhko, does pose a threat to an
economically desirable level of investor trust
153
–, the proper market
incentive should lie with fully exhausting every option at an investor’s
disposal.
154
With the technological capabilities of investors and their
advisors blossoming exponentially, so should insider trading law
acknowledge the current state of play in investment research.
From an economic standpoint, such data activism leads to overdue
price-corrections in the stock market that further pricing efficiency in the
capital markets, thereby helping investors make informed decisions and
allocate capital in a pareto-efficient
155
manner.
156
The important part that
“filling in the ‘interstices in analysis’”). The law even recognizes a copyright interest in an
original selection or arrangement of facts. Feis Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 345, 348 (1991). For a philosophical underpinning of this argument, see Colombatto &
Tavormina, supra note 55, at 21: “[O]ne can make a Lockean claim in favour of exclusive
property rights on the production of knowledge and the use of information (e.g. data treatment
and analysis).”
151. Fletcher, supra note 127, at 532 (“[I]f a trader had to inform her counterparty of the
results of her research before trading, there would be no profits to be earned, nor, more
importantly, would there be any incentives to do research.”).
152. See Salzman, supra note 1 (referencing Tim Harrington, CEO of BattleFin, an
alternative-data company: “[D]riving to retail phone stores to talk to managers and see what
was selling” versus “sell[ing] a product that tracks every time a new phone is turned on and
[ . . . ] find[ing] out quickly ‘which wireless carriers are gaining subscribers and which are
losing them.’”).
153. Karol, supra note 66, at 214–17.
154. See Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, When is it Wrong to Trade Stocks on the
Basis of Non-Public Information? Public Views of the Morality of Insider Trading, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 445, 484 (2011) (commenting on the outcome of an empirical study
carried out by the authors: “In the view of our subjects, merely trading on the basis of an
informational advantage not held by other traders does not make such trading blameworthy
or deserving of punishment.”).
155. See Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100
YALE L.J. 1211, 1215–16 (1991) (“[A] society is not at its optimal position if there exists at
least one change which would make someone in that society better off and no one in it worse
off”).
156. See Fox et. al., supra note 61, at 821–22 (“Informed Trading – trading on information
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investment analysts play in bringing about and maintaining efficiency in
market pricing through their dissemination of complex and amorphous
blocks of information has even been recognized by the SEC.
157
Potentially
holding an investor civilly and criminally liable for helping the market
discover a mispricing quicker arguably impedes the free and self-correcting
nature of the market. Every investor potentially has access to that
information, laying to rest the perceived idea that only hedge funds benefit
at the expense of every other investor. Barring an economically significant
use of scraped data might also impede the existence of various online
services, many of which are dependent on users’ data being gathered for
further use in exchange for free provision of the platform.
158
In addition, trading on scraped data does not only benefit privileged
executives at the expense of ordinary citizens whose privacy rights are
allegedly being violated. On the contrary, alternative data is also being used
as a source for investment research by pension funds.
159
Hedge funds
themselves have pension funds as clients as well, so any significant gains
made by the incentivized fund management also benefit future pension
prospects for millions of workers.
160
Neither is trading on scraped data
or analysis not yet reflected in a stock’s price – drives much of the stock market. [ . . . ] The
basics of microstructure economics reveal that informed trading leads to more accurate share
prices, which in turn increase the efficiency with which the economy allocates goods and
services.”). For a far-reaching reform proposal that is based on the idea that free markets are
currently impaired by disclosure obligations and insider trading doctrine, see Kevin S.
Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, A New Market-Based Approach to Securities Law, 85 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1313, 1345–49 (2018). The authors call for an extensive reworking of securities
law to allow companies to sell off their soon-to-be-disclosed information to the highest bidder,
i.e. the one paying market price, to encourage efficient disclosures as well as a healthy,
supply-and-demand-based information flow that deters inexperienced consumers from
incurring inefficient trading losses. See also Sudipto Bhattacharya & Giovanna Nicodano,
Insider Trading, Investment and Liquidity: A Welfare Analysis, 56 J. FINANCE 1141, 1155
(2001) (“[I]nsider trading can improve outsiders’ welfare”).
157. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 659 n.17 (1983) (quoting from the SEC briefs: “[t]he
value to the entire market of [analysts’] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing
is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, and thus
the analyst’s work redounds to the benefit of all investors.”).
158. Rostow, supra note 108, at 687 (“[D]ata sale is an enormous, multi-billion-dollar
industry that also provides many positive benefits–including the many free services that are
offered online”).
159. Salzman, supra note 1 (“The trend has even been embraced by some pension funds,
historically among the most conservative investors”; partially quoting Marcel Prins, COO of
APG Asset Management with over $400 billion assets under management: “using such
[alternative] data is now ‘part of being an active long-term responsible investor’”).
160. According to a J.P. Morgan study, around 10% of all assets managed by hedge funds
(around $3 trillion in 2018) stem from pension funds. J.P. MORGAN’S CAPITAL ADVISORY
GROUP, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SURVEY: INVESTOR TRENDS AND INSIGHTS 4 (2019), https://
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limited to behemoth hedge funds: Recognizing current market trends on the
basis of smartly accumulated data is, on the contrary, a job perfectly suited
for smaller entities as well, lending credibility to the idea that making
(legally obtained) data available for trading purposes is an equalizer from a
competitive standpoint, not something that deserves to be suppressed.
161
Finally, ordinary consumers might actually benefit from heightened
informational asymmetries through the potential reign of data experts as it
becomes abundantly clear that they can only lose money against more
sophisticated trading competitors and disincentivizes them from actively
participating in a market that can, on a statistical average, only work against
them.
162
D. Compatibility with Rationale Behind Insider Trading Doctrine?
What should be the decisive argument is whether the economic
rationale behind forbidding insider trading in the first place views trading on
scraped data as a scourge to be curbed or as a new-age spectacle to be beheld:
If an average investor rightfully feels that the system is somehow stacked
against him if trading on scraped data is permitted, he might either refrain
www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320747018387.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2W3-CTH9]. APG
Asset Management, which manages over $400 billion in assets for Dutch pension funds,
invests about 10% of that in hedge funds and private equity. Top hedge funds at full capacity
keeps $548 billion APG away, BLOOMBERG, June 7, 2018, https://www.pionline.com/article/
20180607/ONLINE/180609898/top-hedge-funds-at-full-capacity-keeps-548-billion-apg-aw
ay [https://perma.cc/X35T-8NTS].
161. Michael Burry, who –– as the Cassandra of the Financial Crisis of 2009 –– foresaw
the housing bubble based on his own diligent, data-enhanced, research and now manages a
small fund, is currently of the opinion that large investors overvalue big firms and, again based
on his analytical research, sees significant alpha in becoming stakeholder of small-to medium-
sized enterprises, in large part because the market, in his view, lacks ambitious and
entrepreneurial small-time investors. Those, through their kinship with the smaller
enterprises, might feel more inclined to recognize their oft-hidden value. See Heejin Kim &
Myungshin Cho, The Big Short’s Michael Burry Sees a Bubble in Passive Investing,
BLOOMBERG, August 28, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-28/the-b
ig-short-s-michael-burry-sees-a-bubble-in-passive-investing?srnd=markets-vp [https://perma
.cc/7M5V-ZVTQ] (quoting Burry: “The bubble in passive investing through ETFs and index
funds as well as the trend to very large size among asset managers has orphaned smaller value-
type securities globally”). All this to say that data scraping may yet enable smaller trading
entities, including tech-savvy individuals, to spot structural shortcomings of large funds and
other behemoths, thereby correcting a market deficiency that might otherwise have gone
unnoticed.
162. Haeberle & Henderson, supra note 156, at 1361–68 (calling for extensive securities
law reform towards a tiered-access-system to new information on this ground). See also
Fletcher, supra note 127, at 532 (“[T]rading in financial assets is a zero-sum game, the transfer
of wealth between parties is expected to be because of the skill or luck of the counterparty”).
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from participating altogether
163
(thereby contributing to an inefficient
allocation of capital as value-generating exchanges on the stock market are
foregone in favor of less efficient, but seemingly more transparent trades
outside of it) or he might (in most instances, unsuccessfully) try to outsmart
the perceived cheaters (again misallocating resources as the investments into
gaining unfair informational advantages are inefficient uses of capital).
164
That is not the case here. Investors are merely incentivized to use modern
technology for investment research. While some investors might be in awe
of other’s technological prowess regarding the harnessing of alternative data,
that is not to be remedied with insider trading doctrine, but merely signals
the competitive edge at the top that capitalism and free markets are built on.
This hypothesis is backed up by public opinion: In a recent study, in which
an investment analyst was able to profit off of a merger prediction through
acquiring “substantial and quasi-exclusive informational advantages” with
the help of a sophisticated software tool (evoking now-prevalent scraping
trends), the “overwhelming majority” of participants viewed the analyst’s
conduct as legal.
165
This shows that the public at large can and does
differentiate between a competitive advantage based on technological
prowess – even if it leads to all but guaranteeing an investment windfall –
and one that truly originates in some form of unfair behavior. As anchoring
insider trading law in societal perceptions of what should be illegal is a
policy directive not to be scoffed at,
166
this further speaks to the legality of
data scraping for trading purposes.
Scraped data is by no means fool-proof either: With the market volume
of alternative data retail steadily rising, there are also many datasets on offer
that offer conflicting or useless information.
167
Even within the alternative
163. See Green & Kugler, supra note 154, at 454 (“[P]eople are reluctant to ‘buy in’ to a
system that they do not perceive as fair . . . “).
164. For the basis of insider trading liability, see Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and
Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L.REV. 322, 356
(1979). “A rational buyer (or seller) in a market, who knows that the person with whom he is
dealing has material information about the value of the product being exchanged which he
could not lawfully acquire, will either refrain from dealing with that transactor or demand a
risk premium. If the market is thought to be systematically populated with such transactors
some investors will refrain from dealing altogether, and others will incur costs to avoid
dealing with such transactors or corruptly to overcome their unerodable informational
advantages.” Id.
165. Green & Kugler, supra note 154, at 480–81.
166. For further details on the desirable link between social norms and the threat of legal
sanctions, see Green & Kugler, supra note 154, at 450.
167. See Dumont, supra note 36, at 18 (“[C]ombining these less-vetted sources with
processing systems that few understand can also downplay truly material information and
focus too much attention on the noise”); Egan, supra note 3 (quoting Dev Kantesaria, founder
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data market, intelligence, industry and sector-specific knowledge and
independent research still remain key to correctly assess any scraped data
aggregation.
168
That means the typical mechanism of insider trading – one
party receives or misappropriates information in violation of a fiduciary duty
that all but guarantees illicit gains on the stock market
169
– is not even in
(full) force here.
E. Interim Conclusion
As described above, accessing public information (even with
technological means that are not appreciated by the host of the information)
and indexing that data in a way that delineates a point that was previously
drowned out by the sheer abundance of information simply does not
constitute fraud on the market. Rather, it represents the product of one of the
most important skills in the twenty-first century going forward: The ability
to disseminate large portions of information in a way that cuts through all
the noise and illuminates a meaningful point while doing so. That is
something that should be encouraged rather than disincentivized. Trying to
preserve an unnatural informational equality of market participants by
wielding the heavy hammer of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and practically
of Valley Forge Capital Management: “I find the usefulness of datamining techniques to be a
crapshoot”); Horton, supra note 11, at 9 (quoting Evan Schnidman, CEO of Prattle: “There is
a lot of data out there that has been under-analyzed or incorrectly analyzed due to spurious
correlations”); INTEGRITYRESEARCHASSOCS., supra note 39, at 16 (“Alternative data may be
scarce or hard to obtain but that does not necessarily mean it will contribute positively to the
investment process.”); Ian King, Hedge Funds Find an Edge with Big Data, BANYAN HILL,
December 7, 2018, https://banyanhill.com/hedge-funds-big-data/ [https://perma.cc/D2ZF-ZP
GL] (“[A]s the industry gains popularity, and everyone starts using the same data, its impact
on investment returns will be muted”); Kochkodin, supra note 42 (quoting George Mussalli,
CIO at PanAgora Asset Management: “We stay away from over-marketed data purely curated
for hedge fund consumption, such as satellite data, credit card transactions, and email receipts.
These data sources are overused, and we have seen a marked deterioration in their-predictive
power.”); Rostow, supra note 108, at 683 (“Not all information is useful.”); Wieczner, supra
note 3 (“One large quant hedge fund got stung when its algorithm confused sarcastic tweets
about Lululemon’s (LULU) see-through pants debacle with positive sentiment, buying shares
in the yoga-apparel retailer when it should have been selling.”). See also Huan Liu, Fred
Morstatter, Jilian Tang & Reze Zafarani, The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: Uncovering
Novel Research Opportunities in Social Media Mining, 1 INT. J. DATA SCI. ANAL. 137, 137–
38 (2016) (citing examples of problematic data, such as “ . . . bias in social media, data,
evaluation dilemma, data reduction, inferring invisible information, and big-data paradox.”).
168. Kochkodin, supra note 42 (quoting Ray Iwanowski, Principal at Secor Asset
Management LP: “[a]vailable information is not synonymous with useful information”).
169. For a symbolic example, see the wording in United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64,
76 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[Stating] ‘You can make a lot of money by trading on this’ is strong
circumstantial evidence of the tipper’s intention to benefit the tippee”).
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outlawing analytical entrepreneurism in the process is tantamount to
willfully dumbing down investors. That cannot be in the best interest of a
free market.
V. CONCLUSION
Are investments made on the basis of scraped data at risk of being
considered insider trading? After review of the judicial standards and some
extrapolation on questions without on-point case law, the answer is no, as
long as the information aggregated within those data sets is not the product
of hacking (i.e. breaching authentication barriers through technological
means of deception) or does not contain information that can only be
obtained through fiduciary duty violations. Therefore, the only thing that
investors should be very careful about, is aggregating or purchasing data sets
from third parties that contain information about companies that can’t
possibly be available in the public sphere (e.g. proprietary customer data) or
obtain or purchase information that has been accessed through aggressively
dubious technological means.
Might trading on scraped data be illegal sometime in the near future?
As with every difficult prognostic question that involves some reading of
(legal, in this case) tea leaves, the answer to this policy question is: It depends
– and by no means least on one’s views on the best way for (free) markets
for operate. This article posits the view that any policy concerns with data
scraping should be handled by the pertinent substantive law (e.g. data
protection law to combat privacy issues, antitrust enforcement actions to
combat competition concerns etc.) rather than abusing insider trading law for
exactly that. Furthermore, bringing down the hammer of insider trading
doctrine on investments made in reliance on scraped data would fossilize the
current hegemony of digital behemoths and disincentivize analytical data
entrepreneurism, both severe impairments to the free market the U.S. aspires
to be. The only certain thing is that technological evolution is currently
revolutionizing investment research – and insider trading doctrine should
quickly adapt to these changes to avoid being either over-inclusive or
becoming entirely irrelevant.
